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COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION AND ITS 
CHALLENGES 
Patricia A. McCoy* 
Historically, U.S. financial regulation has normally been procyclical, with 
federal regulators and Congress relaxing oversight during bull markets and 
cracking down once financial crises hit. After 2008, the wisdom of this 
approach came under attack. Critics argued that procyclical regulation left 
financial institutions undercapitalized and unable to withstand panics. Other 
critics asserted that economic downturns could be mitigated and even averted 
if regulators took steps to puncture asset bubbles.  
The concept of countercyclical regulation responds to both of these 
critiques. This new approach posits that financial regulation would be more 
effective if financial regulation clamped down during financial expansions 
and lightened up during economic slumps, when banks and other financial 
services firms are struggling financially and typically are at their most risk-
averse. One objective of countercyclical regulation is to require financial 
firms to build up reserves during flush times, so that they can draw on those 
resources when downturns strike. A second potential objective is to modulate 
the growth of easy credit and the asset bubbles that it fuels in order to avoid 
a string of bank failures following a surge in loan delinquencies. 
Countercyclical regulation is the single most important breakthrough in 
years to ending cycles of boom and bust. As such, it deserves serious 
consideration. Implementing countercyclical regulation, however, is not as 
easy as it seems. So far, discussions of countercyclical reforms have been 
mostly limited to identifying tools to address procyclicality and evaluating 
the efficacy of those tools. Institutional and legal impediments to the 
successful implementation of a countercyclical approach, however, have not 
been given sufficient consideration. 
In this Article, I set out to describe the most pressing of those challenges. 
In my view, countercyclical regulation will not be successful unless serious 
attention is paid to the organizational and legal settings in which that 
regulation would operate. Consequently, I seek to shift the focus of the 
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discussion of countercyclical regulation to the real-world context it would 
inhabit in the U.S. and to consider the implications of that context for the 
likelihood of its success. Throughout this discussion, my focus will be on real 
estate asset bubbles, which historically have been the most devastating type 
of bubbles. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I explores the theoretical 
underpinnings of countercyclical regulation and the problems that it seeks to 
correct. Section II discusses the ongoing debate over the proper objectives of 
a countercyclical approach. For at least twenty years, macroeconomists have 
disagreed whether central banks should seek to deflate asset bubbles or 
simply assure that financial institutions are resilient whenever downturns hit. 
This debate has evolved over time as economists and policymakers have 
gained a growing appreciation of the broader set of countercyclical tools at 
regulators’ disposal.  
Section III examines those tools in detail. Countercyclical tools are an 
important part of the emerging field of macroprudential regulation, which 
focuses on the safety of the financial system as a whole instead of the safety 
of discrete financial firms.1 As Section III observes, many countercyclical 
instruments are in their infancy and data are just starting to trickle in on their 
effectiveness. While many of these methods appear to be promising, the 
experience of 2008 showed that substantially more work is needed to refine 
those tools and to ensure that they are used on a timely basis. Nevertheless, 
there is reason to think that the new panoply of sectoral countercyclical tools 
is especially well suited to curbing credit-induced asset bubbles. This 
discussion also sheds light on the vital but wholly underappreciated role of 
market conduct regulators such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
in containing systemic risk through countercyclical regulation. 
The heart of this Article is Section IV, where I discuss the impediments 
facing any serious attempt to institute countercyclical regulation in the United 
States. While some of these problems have been acknowledged in the 
                                                                                                                            
1. See Claudio Borio, Implementing a Macroprudential Framework: Blending Boldness 
and Realism, 6 CAPITALISM & SOC’Y 1, 3 (2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208643 (follow “Open PDF in Browser” 
hyperlink); Douglas J. Elliott et al., The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United 
States, at 6 (Fed. Res. Bd. Finance & Econ. Discussion Ser. No. 2013-29, 2013). Despite their 
name, many macroprudential tools operate at the microprudential level because they are applied 
to individual firms. Nevertheless, those tools serve macroprudential purposes because they apply 
to all financial institutions within a class based on macro indicators, without regard to an 
individual firm’s financial condition. See GROUP OF THIRTY, ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY 
AND RESILIENCE: MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY, TOOLS, AND SYSTEMS FOR THE FUTURE 14 (Oct. 
2010), http://group30.org/images/PDF/Macroprudential_Report_Final.pdf. 
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economics literature,2 other major obstacles have not been adequately 
addressed. Ironically, for instance, there has been little discussion of the 
federal government’s lagging efforts to improve its collection of financial 
system data, despite the key importance of data to systemic risk regulation. 
Similarly, too little attention has been paid to the need for agencies to 
institutionalize an early response system to address burgeoning financial 
threats. Financial innovations and how to monitor them pose special 
problems in that regard and ones that are not well appreciated. Justifying 
intervention when the risks are small is another challenge. While the age-old 
problems of regulatory capture and inertia persist, even resolute regulators 
may have difficulty withstanding legal challenges to certain countercyclical 
rules in the current judicial climate. There is virtually no understanding of 
these legal hurdles in economic circles today. Finally, countercyclical 
regulation, like all regulation, has to deal with the ever-present dynamic of 
industry arbitrage. Innovations introduced by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act or Dodd-Frank) 
offer a partial but potentially powerful solution to that nagging problem. 
Policymakers have more techniques than ever to tackle the challenges 
confronting countercyclical regulation, if they choose to use them. Those 
techniques include new tools that can strike an optimal mix of regulation 
while warding off regulatory capture and inertia. The introduction of these 
new tools also helped make the aims of countercyclical regulation more 
ambitious over time. Early discussions of countercyclical regulation focused 
on the use of monetary policy for countercyclical aims. Because monetary 
policy is not well suited for pricking asset bubbles, many commentators were 
pessimistic about countercyclical regulation’s suitability for that task. But 
since 2008, economists have come to appreciate other, newer countercyclical 
techniques, such as sectoral regulation, that are better tailored to intervening 
in asset bubbles. The focus on these tools has reinvigorated the debate over 
the feasibility and wisdom of proactively deflating bubbles, as I will discuss. 
                                                                                                                            
2. See Borio, supra note 1, at 12–14; MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 33–37 (Geneva Reports on the World 
Economy 11, 2009), http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf; Gerard 
Caprio, Jr., Safe and Sound Banking: A Role for Countercyclical Regulatory Requirements?, at 
23–30 (Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2010-76, 2009), 
https://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp311.pdf; Elliott et al., supra note 1, at 49 
(providing a historical treatment of institutional impediments to past countercyclical initiatives in 
the United States). 
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I. PROBLEMS WITH PROCYCLICALITY 
Procyclical regulation refers to financial regulation that eases during 
expansions and tightens after financial crises.3 Since the 2008 debacle, critics 
have castigated procyclical regulation for intensifying the potential systemic 
harm from asset bubbles, especially bubbles fueled by easy credit.  
Asset bubbles driven by loose credit pose a particular threat to the 
financial system and the economy because those bubbles are usually financed 
through lending by banks. When credit bubbles burst and loans default en 
masse, the losses can threaten the solvency of banks. That raises systemic 
concerns because banks are linked to one another through reciprocal deposit 
accounts, payments clearance, and interbank credit. The failure of one key 
bank can bring down other banks.4  
In an effort to protect themselves from this type of contagion, banks 
usually respond by hoarding resources and severely tightening credit. As 
businesses and individuals who are otherwise creditworthy discover that they 
can no longer obtain credit to finance their operations, there is a growing 
chance of a recession. Because asset bubbles can inflict serious harm on 
finance and ordinary households in the process, these bubbles have serious 
implications for the health of the financial system and the wider economy. 
In view of these problems, procyclical regulation has been singled out for 
criticism on at least two scores.5 First, “light touch” regulation during asset 
bubbles can leave financial institutions with insufficient capital and reserves 
to survive a market crash. Second, deregulation during times of easy credit 
can feed asset bubbles and cause them to overheat. 
Countercyclical regulation seeks to reverse these dynamics by reducing 
the spillover effects from troubled financial institutions on the financial 
system and the economy.6 This new approach seeks to address at least three 
problems that have plagued financial regulation in the United States. The first 
                                                                                                                            
3. For an insightful analysis of different economic theories of financial cycles animating 
discussions of procyclicality, see generally Brett McDonnell, Dampening Financial Regulatory 
Cycles, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1597 (2013). 
4. Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1275–77 (2013). Panics 
by nonbank depositors and losses through a sudden drop in the value of common asset exposures 
can also trigger the failure of multiple banks. See generally Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, What 
Is Systemic Risk?, 45 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 121, 123 (2013); Douglas W. Diamond, 
Banks and Liquidity Creation: A Simple Exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig Model, 93 ECON. Q. 
189 (2007); George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank 
Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, VII INDEP. REV. 371 (2003).  
5. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 10–11; Haocong Ren, Countercyclical 
Financial Regulation (World Bank, Working Paper No. 5823, 2011). 
6. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 31. 
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is the boom-and-bust nature of the credit cycle, in which easy credit fuels 
asset sales and causes asset values to inflate and then collapse.7 The second 
is the procyclical nature of financial regulation, which typically recedes as 
the credit cycle heats up and overcorrects when lending contracts, thereby 
exacerbating swings in the credit cycle. Countercyclical regulation responds 
by designing rules that become binding at the top of the business cycle, when 
financial firms are profitable and catastrophic risks seem small, and by easing 
regulation at the bottom of the business cycle in order to stimulate the 
economy. The third problem, which is related to the second, is financial 
regulators’ perennial aversion to intervention in financial markets in flush 
economic times. The following discussion elaborates on these problems in 
turn. 
A. Credit Booms And Busts 
Countercyclical regulation is mainly concerned with asset bubbles and 
their economic toll. Historically, the most damaging asset bubbles have been 
real estate bubbles fed by easy credit from banks.8 These types of bubbles 
often culminate in massive loan delinquencies and have triggered scores of 
banking crises around the globe over the years.9 Usually, banks respond to 
those crises by cutting back their lending in order to preserve capital, which 
spreads financial distress to the economy at large.10 
Past experience shows that lenders relax their mortgage underwriting 
standards when employment and real estate values are rising.11 Compensation 
systems fuel this dynamic by rewarding bankers for making more loans. The 
                                                                                                                            
7. This aspect distinguishes countercyclical regulation from structural regulation. 
Structural regulation addresses systemic risks that are constantly present, while its countercyclical 
counterpart seeks to address threats to financial stability that ebb and flow over time. See Elliott 
et al., supra note 1, at 3.  
8. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY xliv–xlv, 158–62 (2009); Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 
Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870–2008, 
102 AM. ECON. REV. 1029, 1032 (2012). Not all asset bubbles result in systemic threats to the 
financial system. For example, the technology bubble in the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted 
in a deep decline in the U.S. stock market, but did not put financial institutions in jeopardy because 
that bubble did not involve bank lending in any serious way. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 32; REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 8, at xliv–xlv. 
9. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at xi (“The crisis which began in the US 
sub-prime mortgage market in early 2007 and then spread broadly and deeply was not the first 
banking crisis. It was closer to the 100th.”); REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 8, at 141–42, 147–
55. 
10. See, e.g., REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 8, at 165–67, 171–73. 
11. See, e.g., Caprio, supra note 2, at 3–7. 
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easiest way to make more mortgages is by loosening lending standards in 
order to qualify more borrowers.12 So long as borrowers have the wherewithal 
to service the debt they incurred to finance their purchases of real estate—or 
so long as they can refinance out of unaffordable loans—the price of 
properties financed by those loans will soar. As the cycle nears its top, 
borrowers, lenders, and regulators typically fool themselves into thinking that 
the economy will not revert to the mean and the good times will never end.13 
In the process, market discipline goes out the door. 
As property values climb, those assets can eventually become so costly 
that the average borrower can no longer afford a large enough loan to finance 
an average purchase. The pool of qualified borrowers will shrink, demand for 
real estate will slump, and supply will exceed demand. Then, like Icarus, 
property prices will fall. 
As prices drop, borrowers discover that the traditional escape routes for 
difficulties paying their loans—refinancing the loans or selling their 
collateral for enough to retire their debt—are closed off. Many in that 
situation will go delinquent, because some were poor credit risks to begin 
with or because the collateral is now worth less than the outstanding debt.14 
As defaults precipitate foreclosures, asset prices will fall and inflict losses on 
lenders and the investors who bought the loans. Losses may start to ripple 
through the financial system as firms that extended credit to weakened 
lenders incur losses themselves.15 Most lenders will respond by severely 
tightening credit in order to preserve capital. At some point, however, the 
lenders who survive will realize they overcorrected and the cycle will begin 
anew. 
Countercyclical regulation seeks to defuse this boom-and-bust cycle by 
making financial institutions more resilient during financial crises. Some 
argue that countercyclical regulation should also discourage lenders from 
loosening credit standards excessively as the credit cycle expands and from 
hoarding credit at the bottom of the cycle, as I will discuss. 
                                                                                                                            
12. See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, 12 
EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 499, 504 (2006). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and 
Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 
457 (2009). 
13. See, e.g., REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 8, at 171–73. 
14. Under the double-trigger theory of default, loans only default when both of two things 
occur: the outstanding loan balance exceeds the value of the collateral and the borrower suffers a 
significant income shock. See, e.g., CHRIS FOOTE ET AL., A PROPOSAL TO HELP DISTRESSED 
HOMEOWNERS: A GOVERNMENT PAYMENT-SHARING PLAN 1 n.1 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston Public 
Policy Briefs No. 09-1, 2009). 
15. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 4, at 1265.  
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B. Reversing Procyclical Design 
Countercyclical regulation has a second goal, which is to correct the 
procyclical aspects of financial regulatory design. Procyclical design poses 
concerns because it under-regulates when the economy is expanding and 
over-regulates when the economy slumps, making the business cycle more 
volatile. 
For an example of procyclical design, consider the much-maligned Basel 
II capital accord. Basel II governed the minimum amount of capital that banks 
must hold by requiring them to hold more capital against riskier assets and 
allowing them to hold less capital against safer ones. This design feature is 
referred to as “risk-weighting” because it assigns different risk weights to 
assets depending on the perceived risk of different asset classes. 
Which risk weights to assign is not self-evident, however: the risk weights 
must be derived from somewhere. Basel II specified two methods for 
selecting risk weights, both of which are procyclical.16 First, Basel II 
instructed most banks to base their risk weights on external credit ratings 
issued by the leading rating agencies, notably Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, 
and Fitch. During the bubble culminating in the 2008 crisis, the rating 
agencies inflated their ratings.17 As a consequence of Basel II’s decision to 
incorporate these inflated credit ratings into the risk weights, innumerable 
banks skimped on capital and were undercapitalized when the financial crisis 
hit.18 
The other way of deriving risk weights is similarly procyclical. Basel II 
had a different set of capital rules for the largest international banks. These 
megabanks were allowed to estimate their capital requirements using their 
own internal statistical models, based on as little as five years of data (the so-
called Internal-Ratings-Based or IRB approach).19 Depending on the time 
period, this five-year look back did not always go back far enough to capture 
                                                                                                                            
16. For an evaluation of procyclicality in Basel II generally, see Rafael Repullo & Javier 
Suarez, The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation, 26 REV. FINAN. STUD. 452 (2013). 
17. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL 
SECURITISATION FRAMEWORK 4 (Dec. 2012); Caprio, supra note 2, at 1–2, 8–9; Justice 
Department and State Partners Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding 
Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-state-partners-secure-1375-billion-
settlement-sp-defrauding-investors. 
18. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 17, at 4, 6. 
19. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE INTERNAL RATINGS-
BASED APPROACH (Jan. 2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf. Elsewhere, I described this 
approach as the “fox guarding the henhouse.” Patricia A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming 
Inevitability of Global Convergence in Banking Law, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 433, 456 (2000–2001). 
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data from downswings revealing the true risk of asset classes.20 If the five-
year period was too short to capture the full economic cycle—and in many 
cases it was—those banks ended up underestimating their risk and their 
minimum capital levels as well.  
Accordingly, a second goal of countercyclical regulation is to identify 
design features that exacerbate procyclicality and excise them from financial 
regulations.21 In the Basel III initiative, the Basel Committee has undertaken 
a massive revision of the minimum capital rules designed, in part, to make 
those rules less procyclical.22 Similarly, there is vigorous discussion of other 
ways to remove or tamp down the procyclical aspects of financial 
regulation.23 Dodd-Frank took a constructive step in that direction by purging 
federal banking laws of provisions requiring the use of private credit ratings,24 
in order to reduce cyclicality. 
C. Overcoming Regulatory Inertia 
Finally, countercyclical regulation concerns itself with regulatory inaction 
in the face of financial threats.25 The United States has long struggled with 
inertia by federal prudential banking regulators, with limited success.26 Only 
with the 2008 financial crisis did overcoming regulatory inertia become a 
high priority for financial policymakers. 
Fifty years ago, complacency by regulators was not a pressing concern 
because command-and-control rules governed deposit-taking and lending by 
banks. But in the early 1980s, Congress and state and federal banking 
                                                                                                                            
20. See, e.g., Ren, supra note 5, at 21–22; Rafael Repullo, Jesús Saurina & Carlos Trucharte, 
Mitigating the Pro-cyclicality of Basel II, 64 ECON. POL’Y 659 (2010); Hugh Thomas & Zhiqiang 
Wang, Interpreting the Internal Ratings-Based Capital Requirements in Basel II 19–20 (Journal 
of Banking Reg.,Working Paper, 2004). 
21. Caprio, supra note 2, at 38–39. 
22. See, e.g., Jaime Caruana, Gen. Manager of the Bank for Int’l Settlements, Speech at the 
3rd Santander International Banking Conference: Basel III: Towards a Safer Financial System 
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100921.pdf. 
23. See, e.g., Caprio, supra note 2, at 8–9, 32. 
24. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 
939–939A, 124 Stat. 1601 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
25. For a general theoretical treatment of the problem, see, for example, WILLIAM A. 
NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (2007); R.L. Calvert et al., 
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588 (1989); Antoine 
Faure-Grimaud & David Mortimort, Regulatory Inertia, 34 RAND J. ECON. 413 (2003). 
26. See, e.g., Caprio, supra note 2, at 7.  
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regulators began dismantling this regulatory framework.27 In 1980, Congress 
preempted state usury caps for first-lien home mortgages28 and abolished 
interest rate caps on deposits.29 The 1980 law also raised the federal deposit 
insurance limit from $40,000 to $100,000.30 Finally, the law allowed troubled 
thrifts to mask insolvency, through phony accounting techniques that allowed 
regulators to lower the minimum net worth required of thrifts.31 This latter 
provision had the unfortunate added effect of relaxing the triggers for 
mandatory enforcement actions against undercapitalized thrifts.32 
More deregulation was on the way. In the Alternative Mortgage 
Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA) in 1982,33 Congress gave the green light 
to banks and thrifts to offer home mortgages with variable rates, balloon 
payments, and negative amortization. This set the stage for the toxic 
mortgages that figured so prominently during the recent housing bubble. In 
the early 1980s, Congress and the states also liberalized the types of loans 
and investments that banks and thrifts could make, exposing those institutions 
to greater risk.34  
Many of these changes were set in motion when interest rates began to rise 
in 1978, placing banks and thrifts under heavy financial stress.35 Back then, 
                                                                                                                            
27. See generally Patricia A. McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of 
Subprime and Nontraditional Mortgage Lending, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND 
MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 110 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008). 
28. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), Pub. L. 
No. 96-221, Title V, § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7).  
29. Id. §§ 202, 207(b)(4)–(b)(6), 501(a)(2)(A). 
30. Id. Title III, § 308(a)(1). 
31. Id. Title IV, § 407, 94 Stat. 132 (1980); see also Garn-St Germain Depository 
Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, Title II, §§ 201–202 (1982), 96 Stat. 1469 (authorizing the 
issuance of net worth certificates). The phony accounting device consisted of permission for the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board to issue promissory notes to failing thrifts and then allow those 
thrifts to count the notes as part of their net worth and reserves. Meanwhile, the Bank Board 
watered down its regulatory accounting rules for thrifts in other ways that allowed them to inflate 
their books. See LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK 
AND THRIFT REGULATION 82–87 (1991). 
32. JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., GUARDIANS OF FINANCE: MAKING REGULATORS WORK FOR US 
164–66 (2012). 
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801 et seq. (1982). 
34. For example, Congress expanded the ability of savings and loan institutions to make 
credit card and other consumer loans, commercial real estate loans, and other commercial loans 
in the DIDMCA in 1980 and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act in 1982. Garn-St 
Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, Title III, §§ 321–325, 328–330 (1982), 
96 Stat. 1469; DIDMCA, Pub. L. No. 96-221, Title IV, §§ 401–402, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). In 
addition, Congress and the states started allowing thrifts to make direct equity investments in real 
estate. See generally WHITE, supra note 31, at 67–72.  
35. See generally BARTH ET AL., supra note 32, at 160–63; WHITE, supra note 31, at 67–69.  
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Regulation Q capped interest rates on deposit accounts.36 Depositors 
responded to the rise in interest rates by shifting their money out of banks and 
into money market funds in order to earn higher rates of return. Meanwhile, 
banks became reluctant to lend wherever strict state usury limits prevented 
them from earning market rates of interest on their loans.37 Largely due to this 
loss of business, almost 4,000 U.S. thrift institutions were in the hole by the 
early 1980s.38 
Given these developments, in some ways it made sense for Congress to 
deregulate interest rates on deposit accounts and loans. However, the changes 
instituted in the early 1980s had the unfortunate effect of allowing banks and 
thrifts to expand into riskier activities. These activities included high-cost 
loans to less creditworthy borrowers, direct ownership of real estate that 
exposed banks to property value declines, and payment of high interest rates 
on deposits. 
All of this deregulation put the onus on state and federal banking 
regulators to oversee bank safety and soundness more closely. But instead of 
exercising stricter oversight, for much of the 1980s, state and federal banking 
regulators sat on their hands, keeping failing depository institutions afloat in 
a doomed attempt to allow those institutions to earn their way back into the 
black. Even worse, between 1981 and 1984, the number of thrift examiners 
and supervisors was cut; between 1980 and 1983, so was the number of thrift 
examinations.39 Over that period, on-site examinations of banks and thrifts 
became fewer and farther between, particularly in regions with the most 
troubled institutions.40 
Meanwhile, scores of thrifts took on too much risk and became insolvent. 
Those institutions should have been promptly shut down to avoid further 
losses.41 Instead, state and federal banking regulators delayed the closure of 
many of those institutions, sometimes due to political pressure42 and 
                                                                                                                            
36. Former Federal Reserve Board Regulation Q was promulgated pursuant to the 
provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 162, 181–82 (formerly codified 
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 371a–371b). See also former 12 U.S.C. § 1425b (repealed 1989) (governing 
interest on deposits paid by thrifts).  
37. See generally WHITE, supra note 31, at 67–72.  
38. BARTH ET AL., supra note 32, at 157. 
39. See WHITE, supra note 31, at 88–89; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE 
EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 426–27 
(1997), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol1.html [hereinafter FDIC HISTORY]. 
40. FDIC HISTORY, supra note 39, at 422–26, 428–30. 
41. See, e.g., FDIC HISTORY, supra note 39, at 428 fig.12.2 (showing numbers of problem 
banks in the 1980s); WHITE, supra note 31, at 99–115. 
42. For example, pressure from five U.S. Senators—known as the “Keating Five”—delayed 
the closure of Lincoln Savings & Loan. See Keating Five, N.Y. TIMES, 
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sometimes because they were hoping for a turnaround. Those delays in 
closure—which dragged on for months or years—allowed insolvent 
institutions to gamble for broke, which increased the losses to U.S. taxpayers 
when the institutions eventually failed.43 At some of those institutions, no 
formal enforcement actions were ever taken against them despite their 
deteriorating condition.44 
Putting off the inevitable inflicted a heavy toll. When the 1980s thrift and 
banking crisis came to a close, approximately 1,300 savings and loan 
institutions and 1,617 banks had failed.45 It cost $153 billion to resolve these 
institutions, much of that at taxpayer expense.46  
Regulatory inertia roared back during the lead-up to the 2008 financial 
crisis. The story dates back to 1994, when Congress enacted some modest 
legislation in response to the first signs of abuse in the fledgling subprime 
mortgage market. That year, Congress prohibited some of the worst subprime 
practices in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).47 
However, these provisions of HOEPA covered less than one percent of 
subprime mortgages48 and did not stop the growing tide of accusations about 
home loan abuses. By 2007, over thirty states and the District of Columbia 
had enacted anti-predatory lending statutes of their own in response to 
HOEPA’s deficiencies.49  
These developments by the states triggered a counter-reaction from two 
powerful federal banking regulators in the form of aggressive preemption 
rulings. Previously, in 1996, the nation’s federal thrift supervisor, the former 
U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), had promulgated a sweeping 
regulation asserting federal preemption of state laws regulating residential 
mortgages with respect to federal thrift institutions.50 In 2004, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC), which oversees national banks, 
                                                                                                                            
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/keating_five/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
43. See, e.g., BARTH ET AL., supra note 32, at 159, 166–67; FDIC HISTORY, supra note 39, 
at 439, 454–61. 
44. FDIC HISTORY, supra note 39, at 461. From this, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation concluded that there was something “lacking in the enforcement process.” Id. 
45. Id. at 4 n.1, 15 tbl.1.1. 
46. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and 
Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 33 (2000). 
47. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994). 
48. EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA’S LATEST BOOM AND BUST 
28 (2007). 
49. See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 159, 161 fig.8.3 (2011). 
50. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (1996). 
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issued a virtually identical preemption rule shielding national banks and their 
operating subsidiaries from state anti-predatory lending laws.51 Together, by 
2004, the OTS and OCC were construing their preemption rules to allow 
national banks and federal saving associations to ignore most state consumer 
protection laws on mortgages. To make matters worse, neither federal agency 
replaced the state laws they preempted with equivalent mortgage regulations 
of their own for federally chartered banks and thrifts.52 
The one federal regulator with the power to remedy this situation and 
address reckless mortgage lending across the board was the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. HOEPA had an additional 
provision that commanded the Federal Reserve to prohibit two types of 
abuses: (1) unfair or deceptive mortgage acts or practices; and (2) mortgage 
refinance loans that were associated with abusive lending practices or that 
were otherwise not in the interest of the borrower.53 This power was 
extremely broad in nature because it applied to virtually all mortgage lenders, 
regardless of their charter type or location, and to mortgages regardless of the 
interest rate. However, under HOEPA’s terms, the provision could only be 
activated by regulation or by order. Alan Greenspan, the Fed chairman at the 
time, refused to adopt a rule to trigger the provision during his tenure.54 It was 
not until June 2008, after Ben Bernanke succeeded Greenspan as chair, that 
the Fed finally adopted a rule implementing the unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices provision of HOEPA.55 This sequence of events was a classic case 
of procyclical regulation because the Federal Reserve tightened regulation 
only after crisis struck, not before lending problems spun out of control. 
Admittedly, U.S. banking regulators did start voicing concerns about the 
mounting risks from risky home loans starting in late 2005.56 But for the most 
part, until mid-2008, their response was muted and limited to non-binding 
guidances, confidential examination reports, and isolated enforcement 
actions against small institutions.57 And, just as in the 1980s savings and loan 
crisis, the bank examination process was watered down or absent during the 
run-up to 2008. One regulator—the former OTS—cut its corps of consumer 
compliance examiners by 17.5 percent in 2002. Similarly, it later emerged 
                                                                                                                            
51. Id. §§ 34.3 (mortgage lending), 7.4008 (general lending) (2004). 
52. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 49, at 158–59, 162, 164–68; McCoy & Renuart, supra 
note 27, at 110. 
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(l)(2) (2006). 
54. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 49, at 195–96.  
55. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Official Staff Commentary on Truth 
in Lending—Part III: Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 44522 (July 30, 2008). 
56. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 49, at 168–69. 
57. See id. at 164–66, 169–84, 199–204. 
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that the Federal Reserve Board had declined sub silentio to regularly examine 
the nonbank mortgage lenders that were under its jurisdiction pre-crisis.58 
This account of the last thirty or so years shows that regulatory inertia is 
sometimes the result of discretionary decisions and sometimes the result of 
binding legal constraints. Self-preservation and regulatory capture are often 
reasons why regulators use their discretion to refrain from action.59 Inaction 
can seem safer than action because the status quo usually attracts less 
immediate criticism than taking action. In other situations, inaction is the 
outcome of conscious deregulation by Congress and/or regulators resulting 
in laws or rules that prohibit intervention. Ideological opposition to 
government intervention is another source of government inaction that can 
manifest itself both through binding laws and discretionary decisions.60 
Countercyclical regulation approaches the problem of inertia in two ways. 
First, it seeks to correct the tendency of regulators to sit on their hands when 
action is needed. This objective intersects with the larger dialogue about rules 
versus standards61 and looks for ways to remove discretion in the regulatory 
system. Second, countercyclical regulation seeks to repeal deregulatory 
statutes that prohibit regulators from acting. There is significant debate, 
however, on exactly how countercyclical regulation should go about these 
tasks. 
II. THEORIES OF COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION  
Ultimately, countercyclical regulation seeks to avoid a systemic collapse 
from a series of financial institution failures.62 Its proponents disagree, 
however, on how to achieve that goal. Their disagreement goes to the heart 
of the theory underlying countercyclical regulation.  
Some economists assert that the sole objective of countercyclical 
regulation should be to make financial institutions more resilient so that the 
financial system can better withstand economic shocks.63 This line of thought 
emphasizes the need for financial firms to build higher capital reserves in 
                                                                                                                            
58. See id. at 175, 199. 
59. See, e.g., Calvert et al., supra note 25; MERTON H. MILLER, MERTON MILLER ON 
DERIVATIVES 44–45 (1997). 
60. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 49, at 175–76, 183, 189–96. 
61. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
62. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 31–32; Caprio, supra note 2, at 3–7. 
63. See, e.g., Claudio Borio et al., Procyclicality of the Financial System and Financial 
Stability: Issues and Policy Options, in MARRYING THE MACRO- AND MICRO-PRUDENTIAL 
DIMENSIONS OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 2 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 1, 2001); 
Ren, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
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good economic times when profits are high, to cushion them from losses 
when downturns strike.64  
This goal is relatively uncontroversial, apart from any objections by 
regulated industries themselves. Minds differ, however, on whether 
countercyclical regulation should go further and prick asset bubbles. 
Advocates of this latter approach argue that countercyclical regulation should 
intervene when the credit cycle heats up to stop the growth of excessive credit 
and risk.65 Under this theory, regulators should “lean against the wind” and 
take action while problems are small and can still be contained. 
Initially, the debate over the wisdom of “leaning against the wind” 
revolved around two questions: whether regulators can detect asset bubbles 
accurately, and whether monetary tools are too blunt to deflate them.66 As I 
will discuss,67 there are substantial reservations on both scores. Over time, 
however, the debate has become more sophisticated and begun to ask whether 
other underlying factors that contribute to ruinous asset bubbles—most 
importantly, lax credit—could be the subject of successful early intervention. 
In a related vein, experts are examining other regulatory tools that could nip 
those contributing factors in the bud more successfully than monetary 
policy.68 
Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke’s own views on 
the wisdom of attempting to prick bubbles evolved over time. In 2002, while 
he was a Fed governor under Chairman Alan Greenspan, Bernanke asserted 
                                                                                                                            
64. Ren, supra note 5, at 5, 8. This movement is part of a larger renewed emphasis on higher 
minimum capital requirements for banks and other financial firms. See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI & 
MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT (Princeton Univ. Press 2013). 
65. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 32; Borio, supra note 1, at 5–6; Ren, 
supra note 5, at 4–5; Michael D. Bordo & Olivier Jeanne, Boom-Busts in Asset Prices, Economic 
Instability, and Monetary Policy (NBER, Working Paper No. 8966, 2002); Claudio Borio & 
Philip Lowe, Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus (Bank of Int’l 
Settlements, Working Paper No. 114, 2002); Stephen Cecchetti et al., Asset Prices in a Flexible 
Inflation Targeting Framework (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8970, 
2002); William Dupor, Nominal Price Versus Asset Price Stabilization (Wharton School, 
Working Paper, 2002); Stephany Griffith-Jones & José Antonio Ocampo, Building on the 
Counter-Cyclical Consensus: A Policy Agenda 2–3 (Working Paper, 2009). 
66. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Member, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Remarks Before 
the New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics: Asset-Price 
“Bubbles” and Monetary Policy (Oct. 15, 2002), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021015/default.htm; Asli Demirgüç-
Kunt & Luis Servén, Are All the Sacred Cows Dead? Implications of the Financial Crisis for 
Macro and Financial Policies 26–30 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 4807, 2009). 
67. See infra Section III. 
68. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 32; Demirgüç-Kunt & Servén, supra 
note 66, at 30; Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, supra note 65, at 2–3. 
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in a speech that “‘leaning against the bubble’ is unlikely to be productive in 
practice.”69 Later though, in speeches and press conferences starting in 2010, 
his views changed. The Federal Reserve Board, he said in 2010, “must remain 
open to using monetary policy as a supplementary tool for addressing” 
systemic risk.70 Later, in a 2013 press conference in which he expressed his 
preference for a “tripartite approach” of improved monitoring, supervision 
and regulation, and better communication with markets to deal with asset 
bubbles, Bernanke nevertheless hinted that he would consider interest rate 
hikes too if necessary.71 
Bernanke was speaking from the trenches and no doubt his views were 
shaped by his harrowing personal experience as a top regulator during the 
2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. His changing views also reflected the 
prior decade’s evolving thinking about countercyclical regulation and 
particularly data that were starting to stream in on the initial results of 
countercyclical approaches.72 Much of this evolution involved a new 
appreciation for the variety and breadth of possible regulatory tools for 
countercyclical intervention. 
III. TECHNIQUES OF COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION 
The overriding goal of countercyclical regulation is to address excessive 
build-ups of risk during the economic cycle.73 Some countercyclical tools are 
time-varying, in that their parameters fluctuate according to the business 
cycle.74 Other countercyclical tools maintain constant parameters throughout 
the business cycle and thus are fixed.75 Despite their fixed nature, these latter 
                                                                                                                            
69. Bernanke, supra note 66. 
70. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Speech at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association: Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble (Jan. 
3, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm. 
71. Catherine Hollander, What You Need to Know About Ben Bernanke’s Evolving Views 
on Asset Bubbles, NAT’L J. (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/82386/what-you-
need-know-about-ben-bernankes-evolving-views-asset-bubbles. 
72. See Bernanke, supra note 70; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of 
Governors, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 56th Economic Conference: The 
Effects of the Great Recession on Central Bank Doctrine and Practice (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20111018a.htm. 
73. Claudio Borio has referred to this as the time dimension, which deals “with how 
aggregate risk in the financial system evolves over time.” Borio, supra note 1, at 3. 
74. This is also called the “variable approach.” See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 1, at 14, 
42–43. Examples include countercyclical capital buffers and dynamic provisioning. 
75. See id. Maximum debt-to-income ratios are one example. 
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tools are countercyclical in effect because they address incipient bubbles by 
becoming binding as credit conditions heat up.76 
Countercyclical regulation encompasses a variety of policy interventions, 
including monetary policy, capital adequacy regulation, provisioning, and 
liquidity regulation.77 Other countercyclical tools have garnered less 
attention. Principal among them is sectoral regulation, which consists of 
regulatory techniques to address heightened risks in discrete sectors of the 
economy such as real estate. In this section, I explore these techniques and 
discuss the under-recognized potential of sectoral regulation in curtailing real 
estate bubbles. 
Three themes emerge from this overview of countercyclical tools. First, 
over the past fifteen years, the search for countercyclical methods has wisely 
moved beyond monetary policy to other, more tailored regulatory 
approaches. Second, some countercyclical techniques, such as debt-to-
income and loan-to-value ratios, seek to alter the demand for credit, while 
others, such as capital and reserve requirements, tackle the supply.78 Finally, 
countercyclical design remains in its infancy. The 2008 financial crisis put a 
number of countercyclical tools to the test and their effectiveness was less 
than convincing. Other, newer techniques that were not in effect in 2008 have 
not been fully tested.79 While the early returns from countercyclical tools are 
inconclusive, they drive home the need to refine those tools and strengthen 
them. In addition, the mixed results point to the need to identify and address 
institutional factors that could retard those tools’ success. 
A. Monetary Policy 
Some of the earliest debates about countercyclical regulation involved the 
use of monetary policy to deflate asset bubbles.80 Underpinning these debates 
                                                                                                                            
76. For this reason, these latter countercyclical tools are distinguished from through-the-
cycle tools that seek to make financial institutions more resilient by addressing shared exposures 
and linkages that can jeopardize financial institutions simultaneously through exposure to 
identical risks. Borio refers to this latter issue of interlinkages as the cross-sectional dimension of 
macroprudential regulation. See Borio, supra note 1, at 3. 
77. For a useful inventory of these tools in the United States, see OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 
2013 OFR ANNUAL REPORT 35–38 & fig.27 (2013), http://financialresearch.gov/annual-
reports/files/office-of-financial-research-annual-report-2013.pdf. 
78. See Elliott et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
79. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Address at the 
4th Annual Conference on Evaluating Macroprudential Tools: Advancing Macroprudential 
Policy Objectives (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20150130a.htm. 
80. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
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are concerns that looser monetary policy could intensify risks to financial 
stability.81 Accordingly, the debates have focused on two monetary tools for 
slowing down lending: interest rate hikes and, to a far lesser extent, tighter 
reserve requirements.82 Traditionally, central banks have moved interest rates 
in response to inflation in the price of goods, not to buildups in asset prices 
that could jeopardize financial stability.83 Whether central banks should make 
financial stability an added goal of their discount rate models has proven 
vexing. 
Federal Reserve Board chairmen have varied over the years in their 
willingness to puncture asset bubbles by raising interest rates. William 
McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1951 to 1970, 
teed up the issue when he famously said: “I’m the fellow who takes away the 
punch bowl just when the party is getting good.”84 Former Chairman Alan 
Greenspan was considerably less sanguine about monetary policy’s power to 
halt asset bubbles. In a 2002 speech in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for instance, 
Greenspan asserted: “[I]t was far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified 
early, could be preempted short of the central bank inducing a substantial 
contraction in economic activity—the very outcome we would be seeking to 
avoid.”85 His successor as Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, was more receptive 
to addressing inflated asset prices through monetary tools, but regarded those 
tools as a second line of defense following monitoring, bank examinations, 
and dissemination of information to markets.86 
                                                                                                                            
81. Tobias Adrian & Nellie Liang, Monetary Policy, Financial Conditions, and Financial 
Stability 1–13 (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 690, Sept. 2014), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr690.pdf; cf. Markus K. Brunnermeier & 
Patrick Cheridito, Measuring and Allocating Systemic Risk 2 (Working Paper, 2014), 
http://www.hec.unil.ch/documents/seminars/ibf/1264.pdf (“Systemic risk can build up during 
economic booms but only materializes when a crisis erupts. If not taken into account by 
regulation, this can lead to the situation that a financial system is more vulnerable when observed 
volatility is low, a phenomenon coined as ‘volatility paradox’ . . . .”). 
82. For a history of the past use of reserve requirements in the United States to address 
bubbles, see Elliott et al., supra note 1, at 24–30. 
83. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 57; Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 
Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 253–254 
(2001); Demirgüç-Kunt & Servén, supra note 66, at 26. 
84. Business: The Martin Era, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 2, 1970, at 66, 
http://time.com/vault/issue/1970-02-02/spread/70. 
85. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Remarks at a Symposium 
Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: Economic Volatility (Aug. 30, 2002), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20020830/; see also Ben S. Bernanke & 
Mark Gertler, Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission, 9 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27, 32–33 (1995). 
86. Hollander, supra note 71. 
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As Greenspan noted, any attempt to prevent asset booms and busts through 
interest rate hikes presents a host of difficult issues. First is the problem of 
which asset bubbles to pop. Arguably, the ones to prick are those fueled by 
lending. But say securities lending on margin is becoming overheated, while 
real estate lending is not. Should the Federal Reserve raise interest rates or 
change the margin requirements in response? 
Timing is also a concern. In real time, it can be difficult for a central bank 
to know whether rising asset prices represent an increase in fundamental 
values or a departure. This is particularly true in the early phases of an asset 
bubble, when intervention would be most useful.87 Timing errors could come 
at a high cost, by stunting growth and thwarting the invisible hand of asset 
prices in properly allocating resources. Raising interest rates to prick asset 
bubbles, moreover, is a fairly crude method.88 Doing so could depress values 
across the board, including numerous asset classes that present no imminent 
risk of a bubble.89 Further, stopping a housing bubble could require such 
major interest rate hikes that output would fall.90 Because monetary policy is 
such a diffuse tool for deflating asset bubbles and has such strong ancillary 
effects, using it for that purpose will often violate Mundell’s assignment 
principle that counsels banking regulators to pair policy instruments with “the 
objectives on which [those tools] have the most influence.” Otherwise, 
Mundell warned, “there will develop a tendency either for a cyclical approach 
to equilibrium or for instability.”91 
For these reasons, central banks remain skittish about their ability to 
accomplish both goals—fighting inflation and assuring financial stability—
through monetary tools.92 Instead, much of central bankers’ discussion of 
countercyclical regulation has shifted in recent years to other tools that are 
                                                                                                                            
87. See, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt & Servén, supra note 66, at 29. 
88. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 57. 
89. See, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt & Servén, supra note 66, at 30. 
90. See Bernanke & Gertler, supra note 83, at 257; Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche & Stefan 
Gerlach, Ensuring Financial Stability: Financial Structure and the Impact of Monetary Policy on 
Asset Prices (Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 361, 
2008). 
91. See Robert A. Mundell, The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal 
and External Stability, 9 INT’L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 70, 76 (1962), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3866082. 
92. See, e.g., Caprio, supra note 2, at 7–8; Eugenio Cerutti et al., The Use and Effectiveness 
of Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence 11 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/15/61, 
2015); Leonardo Gambacorta & Federico M. Signoretti, Should Monetary Policy Lean Against 
the Wind? An Analysis Based on a DSGE Model with Banking 2 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
Working Paper No. 418, 2013); Demirgüç-Kunt & Servén, supra note 66, at 30–31; OFFICE OF 
FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 77, at 41–42. 
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better tailored to modulating boom and bust cycles, particularly by severing 
the feedback loop between easy credit and inflated asset prices.93 
B. Capital Adequacy 
Minimum capital requirements are a mainstay of the countercyclical 
arsenal and take center stage in countercyclical financial reforms. The 
primacy of this approach is evident in the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, where 
Congress ordered federal prudential banking regulators to overhaul the 
minimum capital rules to make them “countercyclical, so that the amount of 
capital required to be maintained . . . increases in times of economic 
expansion and decreases in times of economic contraction, consistent with 
the safety and soundness of the” holding company or bank.94 Starting in 1989, 
congressional enactments have introduced counter cyclicality into capital 
adequacy in two distinct respects: one, by changing the capital requirements 
themselves and, two, by requiring prompt closure when banks become 
critically undercapitalized. 
1. Countercyclical Capital Requirements 
Capital adequacy requirements have two main objectives.95 One is to 
ensure that financial institutions have sufficient capital—in the form of 
shareholders’ equity or other substitutes—to absorb unexpected losses. 
Capital, in this sense, provides a safety cushion to ensure that any losses fall 
first on the company’s shareholders. In addition, by helping to internalize 
losses, capital regulation strives to discourage shareholders from shifting the 
onus of a firm’s bad decisions to creditors such as depositors or lenders or, 
even worse, to the federal government and taxpayers. 
This perverse incentive to shift losses arises from the fact that financial 
institutions, like all firms, can finance their operations through a mixture of 
contributions by shareholders (equity) and borrowed funds (debt).96 
Shareholders know that they can improve the return on their investment 
through leverage: that is, by funding the company’s activities less with equity 
                                                                                                                            
93. See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 72. 
94. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 616(a)–(c), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (amending 
12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(g)(1), 1844(b), 3907(a)(1)). 
95. See generally ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 64, at 81–99. 
96. See, e.g., Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the 
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411, 429–30 (1961). 
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and more with debt.97 Commercial banks are much more leveraged than non-
financial companies on average because banks finance most of their 
operations with debt in the form of deposits. 
As leverage increases, shareholders are exposed to a smaller and smaller 
fraction of potential losses and the safety cushion available to protect 
creditors shrinks as well. When a company becomes too leveraged, 
shareholders have incentives to take outsize risks because any profit will 
inure to them while any losses will be borne by the firm’s creditors if the 
shareholders are wiped out. Capital adequacy rules seek to reverse these 
shareholder incentives by requiring financial firms to hold more equity 
compared to debt.98 
Early minimum capital requirements were confined to a simple leverage 
ratio, which is typically defined by dividing shareholders’ equity by average 
total assets.99 The beauty of this ratio is that all assets are weighted the same, 
making it hard to manipulate. In 1988, however, global financial regulators 
became enamored of the risk-based approach in the Basel I Capital Accord. 
Under the risk-based approach, financial institutions were allowed to hold 
less capital against “safer” assets. Basel I divided assets into four categories 
according to risk and each of those four “buckets” received a different risk 
weight (ranging from 0 percent for safer assets to 100 percent for the riskiest). 
Banks were required to hold capital of at least 8 percent of their total risk-
weighted assets. 
Over time, Basel I manifested a number of problems. Ironically, it reduced 
the total capital held in the financial system because less capital had to be 
held against assets that were deemed safe. Similarly, Basel I did not take 
                                                                                                                            
97. For example, take a $10 million firm where shareholders contribute $5 million of the 
working funds and debt makes up the other half. Assume that the shareholders decide to have the 
company invest $1 million in a project with a certain 10% return. The profit on that project will 
be $100,000. The return on equity will be $100,000/$5 million or 2%. Now imagine a scenario 
where the shareholders increase their leverage by investing only 10% or $1 million in the same 
$10 million firm, with debt contributing the other 90%. In that case, the same project will produce 
a return on equity of $100,000/$1 million or 10%. As this shows, shareholders can increase their 
potential returns by loading up the company with leverage in the form of debt. 
98. Whether higher capital levels will reduce risk-taking by banks remains a matter of 
intense debate. Caprio argues, for instance, that if shareholders and managers have a target rate 
of return and supervisors cannot observe their decisions on a real-time basis, higher capital 
requirements might push them toward riskier decision-making. Compare, e.g., ADMATI & 
HELLWIG, supra note 64, at 115–28, with Caprio, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
99. Brunnermeier et al. argue that the denominator should be limited to common equity, not 
total equity, to better align shareholders’ incentives. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 34–
36. 
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account of systemic risk.100 Finally, the Basel I risk weights were easy to 
manipulate. 
There were numerous ways to game the risk weights.101 Those weights 
underestimated the risk that certain assets posed. For example, U.S. 
residential mortgages and sovereign debt were seriously underweighted in 
view of their actual risk, as the 2008 financial crisis and the European Union 
debt crisis showed. That encouraged banks to concentrate investments in 
those asset classes. In addition, Basel I’s design encouraged banks to load up 
on the riskiest assets within a given risk weight bucket. Further, banks did not 
have to hold full capital against assets that they shifted off their balance sheets 
via securitization loans or structured investment vehicles (SIVs), even when 
banks retained exposure to those items through formal or informal 
guarantees.102 This last problem helped fuel the surge in mortgage-backed 
securities and collateralized debt obligations that nearly brought down the 
global financial system in 2008. 
U.S. banking regulators responded to these problems by unveiling the 
Basel II approach in December 2007, unfortunately just in time for the 
financial crisis. Basel II took some initial steps to address operational risk and 
trading risk, but not systemic risk.103 In addition, as mentioned earlier, Basel 
II altered the risk bucket system for assigning risk weights. Under Basel II, 
smaller banks had to base their risk weights on ratings by the credit rating 
agencies, while the largest international banks generated their own risk 
weights using their own internal risk models. These models were only as 
good as their economic assumptions and inputs and ended up severely 
                                                                                                                            
100. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 54–64 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econs., 2008). 
101. For a general discussion of these problems, see Peter King & Heath Tarbert, Basel III: 
An Overview, BANKING & FINAN. SERVS. POL’Y REPORT, May 2011, at 1, 2; McCoy, supra note 
19, at 452–53. 
102. Banks that originated mortgages and then securitized them normally agreed to recourse 
clauses in which they would buy back any mortgages that involved early payment default or fraud. 
See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics 
of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1288, 1361 (2002); Robert T. Miller, The RMBS 
Put-Back Litigations and the Efficient Allocation of Endogenous Risk Over Time, 34 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 255, 289–94 (2014). In a slightly different vein, for reputational reasons in 
2007, Citibank voluntarily agreed to take $49 billion in assets from troubled SIVs back onto its 
books. See Dan Gallagher, Citigroup Says it Will Absorb SIV Assets, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 13, 
2007, 11:36 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/citi-plans-to-absorb-49-billion-in-siv-
assets-onto-balance-sheet. 
103. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 13–17 (2004), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm. 
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underestimating losses in the run-up to the recent crisis.104 In addition, Basel 
II gave the largest financial institutions opportunities to rig their models in 
order to hold less capital.105 Regulators’ ability to detect these problems and 
evaluate the models was questionable. 
The 2008 crisis revealed another problem, which was the procyclical bent 
of the Basel rules.106 At best, Basel I was indifferent to the business cycle and 
did not require banks to accumulate additional capital when times were good. 
Basel II went further and was overtly procyclical. As discussed earlier, Basel 
II’s decision to rely so heavily on private credit ratings and internal models 
encouraged financial institutions to underestimate their risks significantly in 
flush times. 
For all of these reasons, Basel II came under attack in the aftermath of 
2008. Chastened, regulators returned to the drawing board and the G20 
endorsed higher capital levels in the new Basel III Accord in November 2010. 
As this account suggests, minimum capital regulation has had a checkered 
history of success. The numbers tell the story. During the housing bubble, 
from 2005 through 2008, capital levels steadily declined at insured U.S. 
banks and thrifts. In 2006, overall core capital for the U.S. banking industry 
stood at 8.25 percent; by 2008, it had dropped to 7.48 percent.107 Meanwhile, 
one of the reasons Henry Paulson, Jr., and Ben Bernanke argued so 
vehemently for TARP bailouts in the late fall of 2008 was that regulators 
suspected that almost all of the largest U.S. banks were insolvent.108 Across-
                                                                                                                            
104. See, e.g., King & Tarbert, supra note 101, at 3. Regulators had allowed major banks to 
phase in the Basel II system some time before that system was formally unveiled in December 
2007. 
105. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, How Wall Street Lied to Its Computers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 
2008, 7:52 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/how-wall-streets-quants-lied-to-their-
computers/?_r=0; Paul Wilmott, For Wall Street, Greed Wasn’t Good Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/opinion/18wilmott.html?pagewanted=all. 
106. Cf. Joseph G. Haubrich, How Cyclical is Bank Capital? 15–16 (Fed. Res. Bank of 
Cleveland, Working Paper No. 15-04, 2015), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-
events/publications/working-papers/2015-working-papers/wp-1504-how-cyclical-is-bank-
capital.aspx (finding the Basel ratio of Tier 1 to risk-weighted assets “moderately pro-cyclical”). 
107. Statistics on Depository Institutions—Compare Banks, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www5.fdic.gov/sdi/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2016) (computations by author). 
108. In a private interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, then Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that only one of the financial firms that came under 
pressure in fall 2008 “was not at serious risk of failure.” Richard Blackden, Only One US Bank 
was Safe from Collapse During Financial Crisis, Says Fed’s Ben Bernanke, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 
28, 2011, 1:25 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8287381/Only-one-US-
bank-was-safe-from-collapse-during-financial-crisis-says-Feds-Ben-Bernanke.html. Citigroup 
and Bank of America Corporation were in such dire shape that they each eventually received two 
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the-board capital infusions to the nation’s top banks gave regulators cover to 
bail out the sickest of those institutions without having to close them down. 
Despite these cash infusions, by the end of 2008, nearly one quarter of all 
insured U.S. depository institutions were losing money.109 
The severity of these losses forced supervisors to rethink capital 
supervision in Basel III. One of Basel III’s overarching objectives is to boost 
the amount and quality of capital. In addition, Basel III consciously 
incorporates countercyclical elements in order to prod financial institutions 
to build up their capital during economic expansions. One such element 
requires banks to evaluate risks over the entire economic cycle, not just five 
years.110 Another element, called a countercyclical buffer, requires banks to 
hold added capital, over and above the ordinary minimum level, when credit 
conditions start to overheat.111 On top of this, Basel III vests regulators with 
authority to impose an extra capital conservation buffer of up to 2.5 percent 
in order for global systemically important banks to avoid limitations on their 
dividend payments and bonuses.112 The largest banks and bank holding 
companies also undergo macroprudential stress tests to determine whether 
they will have sufficient capital in times of financial stress.113 Basel III further 
                                                                                                                            
TARP bailouts, for a total of $45 billion apiece. See Bailout Recipients, PRO PUBLICA, 
http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
109. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 107. 
110. See Ren, supra note 5, at 21–23. 
111. See id. at 23–27. In October 2013, the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency adopted a final rule mandating a countercyclical buffer for large banks and bank 
holding companies that started phasing in in January 2016. Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory 
Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective 
Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure 
Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule: 
Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018, 62031, 62171 (Oct. 11, 2013). For a general assessment of this 
tool, see Rafael Repullo & Jesús Saurina, The Countercyclical Capital Buffer of Basel III: A 
Critical Assessment 5–8 (Ctr. for Monetary and Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 1102, 2011), 
ftp://ftp.cemfi.es/wp/11/1102.pdf. Some commentators have advocated sectoral capital 
requirements, which would be amassed and spent down like countercyclical buffers but would be 
tailored to certain asset classes, such as housing and housing-related instruments. See, e.g., Adrian 
& Liang, supra note 81, at 17. For a discussion of sectoral capital requirements in a handful of 
countries, see Ren, supra note 5, at 29. 
112. Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital 
Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-
Weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-
Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule: Final rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018, 62031, 62171 
(Oct. 11, 2013). 
113. See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 1, at 45, 48–50. 
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superimposes a simple 3 percent leverage ratio114 on top of the risk-based 
capital ratio. The leverage ratio is an important step forward because it cannot 
be easily gamed. 
In a similar vein, Basel III is the first global framework to impose 
minimum liquidity standards for risks posed by financial institutions to the 
financial system as a whole. The centerpiece of that approach is Basel III’s 
directive to financial institutions to rely more heavily on long-term debt and 
to hold sufficient liquid assets to offset any runs on their short-term debt.115 
The purpose of these requirements is to push financial institutions to fund 
their long-term assets with long-term sources of funds, instead of short-term 
loans of the kind that toppled Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. 
Despite the Basel III initiative, the jury is out on whether it will succeed, 
especially given the incremental nature of its reforms. Basel III, for example, 
leaves the internal-ratings-based approach in place for the largest, too-big-to-
fail banks. Meanwhile, precisely how much added capital it will require 
remains the subject of heavy lobbying.116 Some observers are concerned that 
banks will only be required to hold a measly 3 to 5 percent in total capital at 
the end of the day.117 The effectiveness of capital rules in curbing banks’ risk-
taking appetite remains in question. Finally, there are doubts about whether 
the countercyclical and capital conservation buffers will work if the decision 
                                                                                                                            
114. See Ren, supra note 5, at 11, 20–21. Under Basel III, the leverage ratio takes off-
balance-sheet items and derivatives into account, in addition to total assets. See King & Tarbert, 
supra note 101, at 6. 
115. See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards: Final Rule, 79 
Fed. Reg. 61440, 61440 (Oct. 10, 2014); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: 
THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS 1–3 (2013), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE 
NET STABLE FUNDING RATIO 1–2 (2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm; see also 
GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 1, at 50–51; Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Fed. Reserve Bd. of 
Governors, Speech at the “Finding the Right Balance” 2013 Credit Markets Symposium: 
Liquidity Regulation and Central Banking (April 19, 2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein20130419a.htm. For a general discussion 
of minimum liquidity standards, see BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 39, 45–48; OFFICE 
OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 77, at 46; OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 50–52 
(2014), http://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-financial-research-annual-
report-2014.pdf; INT’L MONETARY FUND, KEY ASPECTS OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY—
BACKGROUND PAPER (2013), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013C.pdf. 
116. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Bankers Are Balking at a Proposed Rule on Capital, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/bankers-are-balking-
at-a-proposed-rule-on-capital.html. 
117. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati, We’re All Still Hostages to the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/opinion/were-all-still-hostages-to-the-big-
banks.html. 
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when to trigger those requirements is left to regulators’ discretion.118 
Consequently, despite the enormous effort being put into capital reforms, 
these problems have prompted a search for other types of countercyclical 
tools. 
2. Prompt Corrective Action Rules 
Despite the Basel Accord’s inherent procyclicality, surprisingly one of the 
earliest U.S. experiments with countercyclical design involved capital 
adequacy. In the aftermath of the 1980s savings and loan crisis, Congress was 
disturbed at regulators’ protracted delay in closing down insolvent banks and 
thrifts. In response, in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1989 (FDICIA), Congress enacted a general rule 
requiring federal banking regulators to close a failing depository institution 
within ninety days after the institution’s leverage ratio falls below 2 
percent.119 This rule—known as the prompt corrective action rule or PCA—
was an early attempt by Congress to impose a binding, objective rule on 
federal regulators in order to constrain their discretion and force them to act. 
Prompt corrective action is countercyclical in that respect. 
                                                                                                                            
118. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 77, at 44–45; Larry D. Wall, Measuring 
Capital Adequacy Supervisory Stress Tests in a Basel World 18–19 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, 
Working Paper No. 2013-15, 2013), 
https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/publications/wp/2013/15.aspx. The Basel Committee has 
suggested using a standardized automatic trigger (consisting of deviations of the ratio of 
nonfinancial private-sector credit-to-GDP from long-term average trends) to circumvent this 
problem. See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 77, at 44; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 
115; Simo Kalatie et al., Indicators Used in Setting the Countercyclical Capital Buffer 1–6 (Bank 
of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 8, 2015), 
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/julkaisut/tutkimukset/keskustelualoitteet/Documents/BoF_DP_
1508.pdf. Wall recommends using stress tests to accomplish the same goal. Wall, supra note 118, 
at 19. For more optimistic forecasts of countercyclical bank capital requirements, see, for 
example, Paolo Angelini et al., Basel III: Long-Term Impact on Economic Performance and 
Fluctuations, 83 THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL 217, 217–19 (2015); Ignazio Angeloni & Ester Faia, 
Capital Regulation and Monetary Policy with Fragile Banks, 60 J. MONETARY ECON. 311, 311–
12 (2013); Ian Christensen et al., Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics 2–3 
(Bank of Canada, Working Paper No. 2011-32, 2011), 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2011/12/working-paper-2011-32/; Papa N’Diaye, Countercyclical 
Macroprudential Policies in a Supporting Role to Monetary Policy 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 257, 2009), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09257.pdf; 
William Tayler & Roy Zilberman, Macroprudential Regulation and the Role of Monetary Policy 
2–6 (Dynare Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 37, 2014), http://www.dynare.org/wp-
repo/dynarewp037.pdf and sources discussed therein. 
119. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c)(3)(B), (h)(3) (2015). 
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During the recent financial crisis, prompt corrective action had some 
partial success. For the most part, federal banking regulators did close 
critically capitalized banks and thrifts according to the timetable laid out in 
the prompt corrective action statute.120 This suggests that the 1989 law 
successfully insulated those regulators from political pressure to prolong 
ailing banks’ survival. 
At the same time, the hope was that mandatory closure would ensure that 
critically undercapitalized institutions were closed while they still had equity, 
thereby shielding the Deposit Insurance Fund from any losses. The reality 
proved otherwise. Although the use of prompt corrective action increased 
tenfold between 2008 and 2011, every bank closed under PCA during that 
period inflicted losses on the Deposit Insurance Fund,121 sending the Fund 
into the red in 2010.122 This suggests that the 2 percent tripwire for closure 
was set too low. If that tripwire was raised to a meaningful level, however, 
there is reason to think that prompt corrective action could work as it was 
intended. 
C. Provisioning 
Provisioning rules require banks to set aside reserves for losses on 
individual loans. These rules resemble capital requirements, except that 
capital rules address unexpected losses while provisioning rules address 
anticipated ones. The main purpose of provisioning is to increase the 
resilience of financial institutions in the event of a crisis. 
Traditionally, provisioning rules have had a procyclical effect123 because 
they have been computed based on losses already incurred, instead of on 
projected future losses. This backward-looking approach produces low 
                                                                                                                            
120. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-612, BANK REGULATION: MODIFIED 
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION FRAMEWORK WOULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 1–6 (2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-612. 
121. Id.; accord FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., EVAL-11-006, EVALUATION OF PROMPT 
REGULATORY ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 4–8 (2011), 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Agency%20Documents/OIG-CA-11-
008.pdf; cf. Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 
87 IND. L.J. 645, 658 (2012) (documenting the increased use of prompt corrective action orders 
during this time period). 
122. Statistics At A Glance: Historical Trends As of March 31, 2013, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2013mar/fdic.html (last updated May 29, 
2013). 
123. See, e.g., Roy Zilberman & William Tayler, Financial Shocks, Loan Loss Provisions 
and Macroeconomic Stability 2–4 (Lancaster Univ. Mgmt. Sch. Dep’t. of Econ., Working Paper 
No. 2014/023, Nov. 2014), http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/71600/. 
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reserves when economic conditions are favorable and high reserves during 
economic declines. As a result, by the time that losses begin to mount, banks 
often have inadequate reserves to cover them. That was exactly what 
happened while the housing bubble was gathering steam from 2002 to mid-
2006, when U.S. banks steadily slashed their loan loss reserves.124 
Countercyclical regulation attempts to reverse this sequence through a 
new approach known as dynamic provisioning. When the economy heats up, 
dynamic provisioning activates a component in the algorithm for loss 
reserves that calculates those reserves as if the economy was contracting. 
Later, if the economy takes a nosedive, that component is set to zero and 
banks can draw on the reserves that they accumulated during the upswing to 
absorb their losses.125  
It is not yet clear whether dynamic provisioning helps restrain asset 
bubbles. Spain adopted dynamic provisioning in 2000; later Colombia, Peru, 
Bolivia and Uruguay followed suit.126 This new approach to loan loss 
reserves, however, was not enough to stop a credit bubble in the Spanish 
banking system from bursting after 2008.127 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the U.S. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) took a different approach to 
countercyclical provisioning when they issued their so-called “expected loss 
provisioning” proposal in 2011.128 Under that proposal, accountants would 
estimate loan losses over the loan’s remaining life rather than basing their 
estimates on losses already incurred. However, a loan’s remaining life may 
not coincide with a full business cycle, which means that some degree of 
                                                                                                                            
124. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 49, at 212 figs.11.1 & 11.2 (computations by authors). 
125. Caprio, supra note 2, at 22; see also Ren, supra note 5, at 11–19. 
126. See Caprio, supra note 2, at 13–14, 19 (Spain, Colombia, and Peru adopting dynamic 
provisioning); Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, supra note 65, at 4 (stating that Spain pioneered 
dynamic provisioning in 2000); Martha López et al., Credit Cycles, Credit Risk and 
Countercyclical Loan Provisions 9–10 (Borradores de Economía, Banco de la Republica, 
Working Paper No. 788, 2013) (discussing dynamic provisioning in Colombia). 
127. Caprio, supra note 2, at 13–23; Ren, supra note 5, at 11–19; see also BRUNNERMEIER 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 37. But see Carlos Trucharte & Jesús Saurina, Spanish Dynamic 
Provisions: Main Numerical Features, 25 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 11, 11, 46 (2013), 
http://www.asbaweb.org/E-News/enews-36/CONTR/3%20Contrib.pdf (concluding that the 
countercyclical provisions amassed by Spanish banks at the peak of the cycle “reduced in an 
equivalent amount the public capital injections required by these banks” during the later 
downturn). 
128. Edith Orenstein, FASB Further Develops Current Expected Credit Loss Model, FIN. 
EXECS. INT’L (Sept. 14, 2012, 10:56 AM), 
http://www.financialexecutives.org/KenticoCMS/FEI_Blogs/Financial-Reporting-
Blog/September-2012/FASB-Further-Develops-Current-Expected-Credit-
Loss.aspx#ixzz3q6o9lcGr. 
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procyclicality may persist. Additionally, if companies obtain too much 
discretion under this new approach, they may use provisioning to smooth 
income in other, misleading ways.129 
Suffice it to say, it is too early to tell whether countercyclical reforms to 
traditional provisioning practices will have their intended effect. Ultimately, 
FASB elected not to adopt the IAIS proposal in the United States.130 There is 
evidence that Colombia’s provision helped to dampen the credit cycle,131 
while Spain’s experience with dynamic provisioning made domestic banks 
more resilient but did not curb the credit boom.132 More work is needed on 
how to design countercyclical provisioning for greater success. 
D. Sectoral Regulatory Tools 
 A final set of countercyclical tools targets sectors that are prone to asset 
bubbles or are likely to exacerbate a bubble’s effects. In the United States and 
many other countries, the most prominent of those sectors is real estate 
finance.  
Real estate lending is an obvious sector to target because the most 
destructive asset bubbles historically have involved real estate. The 1980s 
savings and loan crisis was driven by real estate credit, as was the 2008 
debacle, and both crises sparked prolonged recessions. Across the world and 
over the centuries, bubbles fueled by real estate loans have had the most 
devastating economic effects, both in advanced economies and emerging 
markets.133 
                                                                                                                            
129. Caprio, supra note 2, at 12–13; Ren, supra note 5, at 11–13, 18–19. 
130. See Hans Hoogervorst, Chairman, Int’l Accounting Standards Bd., Speech at the Asia-
Oceanic Regional Policy Forum: Closing the Accounting Chapter of the Financial Crisis (March 
8, 2014), at 1, 3–4, http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/Conference/Documents/2014/Speech-Hans-
Hoogervorst-March-2014.pdf. 
131. López et al., supra note 126, at 10–11. Another, broader study of countercyclical 
provisioning measures around the world concluded that “increasing loan-loss provisioning 
requirements tend[s] to slow credit growth.” Kenneth Kuttner & Ilhyock Shim, Taming the Real 
Estate Beast: The Effects of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies on Housing Prices and 
Credit, in RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA CONFERENCE VOLUME 231, 232 (Alexandra Heath et al. 
eds., 2012), http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2012/pdf/kuttner-shim.pdf. 
132. Borio, supra note 1, at 6; Caprio, supra note 2, at 13–23; Ren, supra note 5, at 11-19; 
see also BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 37. But see Cerutti et al., supra note 92, at 13 
(“[D]ynamic provisioning, used almost exclusively in emerging markets, has a negative relation 
with overall credit growth.”). 
133. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 8, at 158–62; Schularick & Taylor, supra note 8, at 
1032. 
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To date, sectoral tools have mostly been used to prevent real estate lending 
standards from deteriorating during business cycles. Some of these sectoral 
tools operate by constraining the demand for credit, including maximum 
loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income caps, and other rules governing 
borrowers’ ability to repay.134 Other sectoral tools, especially higher capital 
risk weights for targeted sectors, seek to restrain the supply of credit.135 By 
providing regulatory guardrails, these instruments seek to prevent reckless 
lending and ensuing booms and busts in real estate prices. 
So far, sectoral tools have not received the attention they deserve. Most of 
the discussion of countercyclical regulation has focused on monetary policy 
and on minimum capital standards and rules governing provisioning. In the 
meantime, the Dodd-Frank Act drew attention to a new suite of sectoral tools 
that directly address the types of lax credit conditions that can cause asset 
bubbles to expand and explode.  
These sectoral tools are a valuable addition to the countercyclical portfolio 
for at least two reasons. Unlike monetary policy, sectoral tools are 
specifically designed to prick asset bubbles while they are inflating. As such, 
sectoral tools attack incipient bubbles directly. Further, sectoral tools have 
the potential to dampen systemic risk by preventing imprudent lending and a 
resulting race to the bottom in credit standards. Initial findings have 
concluded that sectoral tools, when tightened, are effective in restraining the 
growth of credit during expansions but less successful in encouraging the 
growth of credit during downturns.136 
1. Loan-to-Value Limits 
Of all the sectoral tools, maximum loan-to-value ratios have received the 
most attention. These caps limit how much a debtor can borrow against the 
value of a parcel of real estate. Where the maximum loan-to-value ratio is 80 
percent, for example, the most that a homeowner can borrow is 80 percent of 
the appraised value of the home. 
                                                                                                                            
134. The federal government has a long history of using these and other techniques to 
regulate underwriting standards for loans, mostly directed at depository institutions but sometimes 
at nonbank lenders as well. While the normal purpose of those rules was safety and soundness or 
consumer protection, sometimes it was to contain credit bubbles. For a thorough history, see 
Elliott et al., supra note 1, at 9–17. 
135. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 115, at 18–19. 
136. See Borio, supra note 1, at 6; Elliott et al., supra note 1, at 47. 
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It is well-established that higher loan-to-value ratios are positively 
associated with higher probabilities of default.137 For this reason, federal 
banking regulators expect banks to limit their commercial real estate loans to 
stated maximum loan-to-value ratios.138 Currently, however, the federal 
government has no legally mandated loan-to-value caps for residential real 
estate loans. Outside of the United States, a growing number of jurisdictions, 
including Canada, China, Colombia, the Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, and a number of Eastern European nations, 
have adopted maximum loan-to-value ratios as part of their countercyclical 
arsenals.139 
Loan-to-value caps have strong potential as a countercyclical tool because 
lower loan-to-value ratios can keep housing prices in check and also credit 
                                                                                                                            
137. See, e.g., Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57928, 57994 n.96(a) (proposed Aug. 28, 
2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-09-20/pdf/2013-21677.pdf; Kristopher Gerardi 
et al., Decomposing the Foreclosure Crisis: House Price Depreciation versus Bad Underwriting 
1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-25, 2009), 
https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/publications/wp/2009/09_25.aspx; Min Qi & Xiaolong 
Yang, Loss Given Default of High Loan-to-Value Residential Mortgages 1 (Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Working Paper No. 2007-4, 2007), 
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/economics-working-papers/2008-
2000/wp2007-4.pdf (reviewing literature). 
138. Under federal bank regulatory guidelines dating back to 1992, loans secured by raw land 
are supposed to be limited to a highly conservative loan-to-value ratio of sixty-five percent, 
followed by seventy-five percent for land development loans. The top loan-to-value ratio for 
construction loans for commercial, other non-residential, and multi-family residences is eighty 
percent, while the maximum ratio for construction loans for 1 to 4 family residences and improved 
property is eighty-five percent. See 12 C.F.R. pts. 34 subpt. D, app. A, 208 app. C, 365 app. A. 
139. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 1, at Annex II (noting adoption of maximum LTV 
ratios in Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore); INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, supra note 115, at 18–19, 22 (noting adoption of maximum LTV ratios in a number of 
countries, including Canada, China, and Colombia); Adrian & Liang, supra note 81, at 20–21 
(noting adoption of maximum LTV ratios in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea); Ren, supra 
note 5, at 11, 29 (noting adoption of maximum LTV ratios in a plethora of countries). In addition, 
some countries, including Australia, India, Israel, and Spain, attach higher risk weights to 
mortgages with higher loan-to-value ratios for purposes of calculating capital adequacy 
requirements. See, e.g., Ren, supra note 5, at 29. 
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growth.140 Nevertheless, these caps are not failsafe.141 When collateral values 
are rising, borrowers can take on more debt because the cap normally remains 
constant. Similarly, a tough cap alone does not prevent a borrower from later 
incurring additional debt that could impair his or her ability to repay an earlier 
mortgage. Such debt could be unsecured or take the form of a junior 
mortgage.142 In addition, loan-to-value ratios can be—and have been—rigged 
by inflating the underlying appraisals.143 
After 2008, the fate of a U.S. proposal to impose risk retention 
requirements on securitizers for all residential loans with loan-to-value ratios 
exceeding 70 percent illustrated the tough social tradeoffs involved in 
imposing those limits. The proposal provoked fierce controversy—both from 
realtors and from consumer groups—because of the adverse effect those 
limits would have had on access to credit.144 Very few U.S. consumers of 
                                                                                                                            
140. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 115, at 23–24; Cerutti et al., supra note 
92, at 11–13; Kuttner & Shim, supra note 131, at 255–56; Chris McDonald, When is 
Macroprudential Policy Effective? 2 (Bank for Int’l. Settlements, Working Paper No. 496, 2015), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work496.pdf; Peter Morgan et al., Loan-to-Value Policy as a 
Macroprudential Tool: The Case of Residential Mortgage Loans in Asia 3 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., 
Working Paper No. 528, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2622433; 
Daan Struyven, The Effects of Macroprudential and Fiscal Policy on Mortgage Debt: Evidence 
from the Netherlands 2 (Mass. Inst. Tech., Working Paper, April 15, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616472. 
141. See, e.g., Adrian & Liang, supra note 81, at 20–21. 
142. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 53. 
143. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al., Collateral Valuation and Borrower Financial 
Constraints: Evidence from the Residential Real Estate Market 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 19606, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19606.pdf. In the 
Dodd-Frank Act, Congress responded to this problem by mandating stricter oversight of home 
appraisals. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1601, 124 Stat. 1376, 2223 (2010) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (2015)); Appraisals for Higher-Priced Mortgage Loans, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 10368, 10398 (Feb. 13, 2013). 
144. Originally, the proposed qualified residential mortgage rule mandated by Dodd-Frank 
solicited comment on whether Wall Street banks and other securitizers should be required to keep 
more “skin in the game” in the form of a risk retention requirement for certain residential 
mortgages with loan-to-value ratios of higher than 70%. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 
57928, 57932 (proposed Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-09-
20/pdf/2013-21677.pdf. The proposal ignited a firestorm of criticism from lenders and consumer 
groups and prompted regulators to issue a new proposed rule removing that requirement. The 
final rule dispensed with any risk retention requirement (whether keyed to loan-to-value ratios or 
otherwise) for residential mortgage loans that met the definition of a qualified mortgage. See 
Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77607, 77685, 77688–89 (Dec. 24, 2014), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-24/pdf/2014-29256.pdf. For the definition of a 
qualified mortgage, see 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A) (2015); Ability to Repay and Qualified 
Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408 (Jan. 30, 
2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-30/pdf/2013-00736.pdf. 
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modest means can muster a down payment of even 20 percent.145 These 
disparities are particularly pronounced for minority borrowers. Researchers 
at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the Center for 
Responsible Lending concluded in 2012, for instance, that 75 percent of 
African-American borrowers and 70 percent of Latino borrowers with 
performing loans could not have afforded a 20 percent down payment 
requirement when they first obtained their mortgages.146 Accordingly, a 
search has been underway in the United States for other, more finely tuned 
sectoral tools that could prevent real estate bubbles without impinging so 
heavily on access to credit.  
2. Debt-to-Income Limits 
Debt-to-income limits are another common way of reducing default risk. 
These caps restrict a borrower’s monthly payments for mortgage debt and 
other extensions of credit to a set percentage of the borrower’s gross income. 
Prior to the housing bubble, for example, under their manual underwriting 
guidelines, the housing finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would 
not buy a mortgage unless the monthly payment for principal, interest, 
insurance and taxes was 28 percent or less of the borrower’s monthly gross 
income. More recently, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
imposed a much more liberal maximum debt-to-income ratio of 43 percent 
on mortgages known as “qualified mortgages” in its 2013 ability-to-repay 
rule.147 Debt-to-income caps are also used in the Republic of Korea and in the 
Hong Kong SAR.148 
                                                                                                                            
145. See, e.g., DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R7-5700, ABILITY TO REPAY, 
RISK-RETENTION STANDARDS, AND MORTGAGE CREDIT ACCESS 13–15 (2012), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42056.pdf; ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., BALANCING RISK 
AND ACCESS: UNDERWRITING STANDARDS AND QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 10–11 
(2012), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/Underwriting-
Standards-for-Qualified-Residential-Mortgages.pdf; Revitalizing the Private Mortgage Market: 
‘Skin in the Game’ and the Consequences for Future Homebuyers, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON 
(May 11, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2775. 
146. QUERCIA, ET AL., supra note 145, at 10–11, 27–28. 
147. Under that rule, home mortgages that meet the 43% cap and certain other requirements 
qualify the lender for protection from lawsuits by borrowers who claim that the lender failed to 
make a reasonable determination of the borrower’s ability to repay. See Ability to Repay and 
Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408; 
see also Dodd-Frank Act, § 1412 (giving regulators discretion to include a debt-to-income test in 
the definition of a qualified mortgage). 
148. See Ren, supra note 5, at 11, 29. 
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Lower debt-to-income ratios are positively correlated with slower growth 
in housing credit149 and better default rates.150 But like loan-to-value caps, 
these ratios are relatively blunt. A high-income borrower may well be able to 
repay a loan even with a high ratio of debt to income. Meanwhile, a lower-
income borrower who meets the debt-to-income test may still not have 
enough to live on after the monthly mortgage payment. As this suggests, the 
debt-to-income ratio does not address the central issue, which is how much 
residual income a borrower has left to work with each month after sending in 
the mortgage check. The only major lending program that uses a residual 
income test, however, is the Veterans Administration in its guaranteed loan 
program for military veterans.151  
And like loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios can be gamed. One 
way to do that is to falsify the amount of income that is reported.152 Another 
way is to take on additional unsecured debt after the mortgage is incurred. 
Due to all of these concerns, attention in the United States has shifted to a 
third sectoral technique for constraining credit risk, namely, ability-to-repay 
rules.  
3. Ability-to-Repay Rules 
Dodd-Frank’s biggest innovation involving sectoral rules was its adoption 
of an ability-to-repay requirement in 2010.153 That provision states that “no 
creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a 
reasonable and good faith determination . . . that, at the time the loan is 
consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan,” 
                                                                                                                            
149. Cerutti et al., supra note 92, at 11–13; Kuttner & Shim, supra note 131, at 254–56; 
McDonald, supra note 140, at 2–4. 
150. See Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6566–67, 6574. 
151. Id. at 6408, 6486–87 & n.117. In a somewhat different context, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s ability-to-repay rule provides that borrowers with subprime qualified 
mortgages can prove a violation of that rule “by showing that, at the time the loan was originated, 
the consumer's income and debt obligations left insufficient residual income or assets to meet 
living expenses.” Id. at 6409; see also id. at 6462, 6479, 6485–87, 6511–16, 6525, 6528; 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1026.43(e)(1). Preliminary research suggests that the VA residual income test is successful in 
lowering default rates. See Jun Zhu, Is Residual Income the Key to the Superior Performance of 
VA loans?, URBAN INST. (July 16, 2014), http://blog.metrotrends.org/2014/07/residual-income-
key-superior-performance-veterans-administration-loans/. 
152. See, e.g., Wei Jiang et al., Liar’s Loan? Effects of Origination Channel and Information 
Falsification on Mortgage Delinquency 24 (Feb. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://kelley.iu.edu/BEPP/documents/Nelson.pdf. 
153. Dodd-Frank Act § 1411. 
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including all associated taxes, insurance, and homeowners’ assessments.154 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a final rule implementing 
this provision in January 2013.155 
The ability-to-repay rule is of landmark significance in a number of 
respects. It represents a radical departure from the attitude once held by many 
federal regulators and members of Congress that it was in lenders’ self-
interest to ensure the repayment of loans.156 As the financial crisis sadly 
showed, that old incentive system broke down with the rise of securitization. 
Once lenders realized that they could make money upfront from the fees they 
charged to borrowers and their proceeds from selling loans, they slashed their 
lending standards, knowing that they could pass bad loans and the heightened 
default risk that those loans posed on to unsuspecting investors. 
The rule also breaks new ground by operationalizing the meaning of a 
“reasonable determination” of the ability to repay in certain important 
respects. Now the loan underwriter’s determination must be based on 
“verified and documented information” regarding the borrower’s income and 
assets.157 This rules out the dangerous practice of low-documentation and no-
documentation loans that flourished during the housing bubble. As a result, a 
lender can no longer approve a mortgage based only on an assertion by a 
borrower or broker as to the borrower’s wages or assets.158 This will 
fundamentally reduce the opportunities for falsification and for rigging debt-
to-income ratios and other underwriting tests. This should also cut default 
rates on home loans because stated income loans made during the housing 
boom were associated with markedly higher default rates.159 
Still another notable aspect of the rule is its command that lenders must 
take a borrower’s other indebtedness and any other credit extensions secured 
by the home into account when ascertaining the ability to repay.160 This means 
                                                                                                                            
154. Id. § 1411(a)(2). 
155. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408. 
156. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 49, at 192–93. 
157. Dodd-Frank Act § 1411(a)(2). 
158. Id. 
159. See, e.g., Adam Ashcraft et al., MBS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom, 449 FED. 
RES. BANK N.Y. STAFF REP. 1, 28 (2010), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr449.pdf (noting that 
mortgage-backed securities issues with higher rates of low-documentation loans performed 
worse); Michael LaCour-Little & Jing Yang, Taking the Lie Out of Liar Loans: The Effect of 
Reduced Documentation on the Performance and Pricing of Alt-A and Subprime Mortgages, 35 
J. REAL EST. RES. 507, 508 (2013), 
http://pages.jh.edu/jrer/papers/pdf/past/vol35n04/05.507_554.pdf. 
160. Dodd-Frank Act § 1411(a)(2). 
  
 
 
 
47:1181] COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION 1215 
that a lender cannot base its underwriting analysis solely on the amount of 
equity that the borrower has in the home161 in the cynical expectation of 
seizing that equity if the borrower ends up in foreclosure. Further, every time 
the borrower seeks to encumber the property with more debt, the new lender 
must evaluate the borrower’s ability to repay anew. That will help prevent 
evasion of loan-to-value and debt-to-income tests, as well as a repeat of 
equity stripping scams that typified the subprime market in the 2000s.162 
A sister clause in Dodd-Frank works in tandem with this provision by 
outlawing the most common ways of artificially rigging the monthly payment 
to make it appear smaller for purposes of underwriting. Now underwriters 
must assume that all loans are fully amortizing when evaluating a borrower’s 
ability to repay, which will have the effect of boosting the size of loan 
payments for purposes of that determination. Similarly, for adjustable-rate 
loans, underwriters must use the monthly payment based on the fully indexed 
rate and not on a low initial teaser rate in assessing ability to repay.163 
Dodd-Frank discouraged violations of the ability-to-repay rule through 
potentially strong oversight and sanctions. Compliance with the rule is 
subject to federal examination and enforcement.164 In addition, Dodd-Frank 
authorized private relief under certain circumstances. Injured borrowers can 
bring a private right of action for violations of the ability-to-repay rule in the 
first three years following origination and can also raise a defense to 
foreclosure based on those violations without time limit.165 However, lenders 
enjoy a presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay rule so long as 
the loan is a qualified mortgage.166  
                                                                                                                            
161. Id. (noting that a lender’s determination of a consumer’s ability to repay cannot be based 
on his or her “equity in the dwelling or real property that secures repayment of the loan”). 
162. “Equity stripping” refers to schemes where a lender urges a borrower to refinance 
repeatedly in order to generate successive rounds of closing fees. Usually, the closing fees are 
financed and tacked on to the principal, which can cause monthly payments to go up. Equity 
stripping schemes often occur during periods of rising home prices, where lenders look to the 
value of the collateral alone, and not to borrowers’ financial capacity, for repayment of the loan. 
163. Dodd-Frank Act § 1411(a)(2). The fully indexed rate is the rate produced by adding the 
index rate on the date the loan is made to the margin that goes into effect after the teaser rate 
expires. Id. 
164. Authority for supervising institutions for compliance with the ability-to-repay rule is 
divided between the CFPB, which supervises non-depository institutions and depository 
institutions with total assets of more than $10 billion, and state and federal prudential banking 
regulators, which supervise smaller depository institutions. Id. §§ 1024(a)(1)(A), 1025–26. In 
addition, state attorneys general may sue mortgage lenders, including banks, in court for 
violations of Bureau rules, including the ability-to-repay rule. Id. § 1042(a). 
165. Id. §§ 1413, 1416(b). 
166. Id. § 1412. The presumption is an irrebuttable presumption for all qualified mortgages 
except higher-priced qualified mortgages, which only provide a rebuttable presumption. In order 
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It is too early to know whether these sectoral tools will deflate real estate 
bubbles. However, there are reasons to think that sectoral tools might succeed 
where monetary policy, capital regulation, or provisioning rules might not. 
Sectoral tools directly target the volume of credit by prohibiting specific 
types of loans and underwriting practices that have been endemic to housing 
bubbles in the past. In addition, the ability-to-repay standards and the debt-
to-income ratios adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act apply to all mortgage 
originators across the country, whether state- or federally-chartered and 
banks or nonbanks.167 Consequently, mortgage lenders cannot shop 
regulators, jurisdictions, or legal regimes in order to escape those standards. 
Capital rules and provisioning rules, in contrast, are easier to arbitrage 
because they do not normally apply to nonbank lenders. 
The importance of the ability-to-repay rule and the CFPB’s exclusive role 
in promulgating that rule has another, very different ramification. It is a 
mistake to ignore the role of market conduct supervisors such as the CFPB in 
countercyclical regulation. The centrality of consumer financial protection in 
ensuring sensible loan underwriting standards—particularly for home 
mortgages—underscores the vital role that market conduct regulators such as 
                                                                                                                            
to rebut the presumption of a reasonable determination of ability to repay in a higher-priced 
covered transaction, a borrower must show that the lender did not make a reasonable and good-
faith determination of his or her repayment ability at the time of consummation, by showing that 
the borrower’s income, debt obligations, alimony, child support, and monthly payment (including 
mortgage-related obligations) on the mortgage at issue and on any simultaneous loans of which 
the lender was aware at consummation would leave the borrower with insufficient residual income 
or assets other than the value of the dwelling (including any real property attached to the dwelling) 
that secured the loan with which to meet living expenses, including any recurring and material 
non-debt obligations of which the lender was aware at the time of consummation. 12 C.F.R. § 
1026.43(e)(1) (2015). A higher-priced covered transaction includes most home mortgages with 
an annual percentage rate that exceeds the average prime offer rate for a comparable transaction 
as of the date the interest rate is set by 1.5 or more percentage points for a first-lien covered 
transaction, or by 3.5 or more percentage points for a subordinate-lien covered transaction. Id. § 
1026.43(b)(4). 
Subject to certain exceptions for government-insured or government-guaranteed loans, in 
order for a mortgage to be a qualified mortgage, it must be fully amortizing, total points and fees 
must not exceed 3% of the total loan amount, the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio may not exceed 
43%, and the loan term may not exceed 30 years. In addition, the income and financial resources 
that the borrower relied on to qualify for the loan must have been verified and documented. 
Adjustable-rate loans must also be underwritten to the maximum interest rate during the first five 
years. Any prepayment penalties in qualified mortgages are subject to strong restrictions. Dodd-
Frank Act §§ 1412, 1414(a); Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth 
in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408. 
167. The ability-to-repay provisions apply to virtually all mortgage lenders, regardless of 
charter. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1022(b)(1), (b)(4)(A), 1411(a)(2), 1412. 
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the CFPB will play in the federal government’s efforts to prevent future, 
catastrophic real estate bubbles. 
To summarize, the past fifteen years has ushered in an exciting period of 
exploration and experimentation regarding different types of regulatory 
techniques to dampen economic cycles. While initial results are generally 
promising, it is too soon to tell whether these tools will succeed at their task 
in their current or some modified form. The best way to design these tools—
and the choice of the best tool for a given situation—will require more 
experimentation and evaluation in years to come. 
Regulators are also grappling with the fact that the current kit of 
countercyclical tools is highly bank-centric.168 Since the late 1980s, the 
majority of outstanding private debt held in the United States was originated 
in the capital markets or by other nonbanks.169 Consequently, countercyclical 
requirements that are limited to commercial banks will not bind lending 
outside of that sector. The Financial Stability Board has floated the idea of 
time-varying margin or haircut requirements for short-term nonbank loans 
and repo transactions,170 but so far the countercyclical aspects of that proposal 
have not gained traction.171 
                                                                                                                            
168. See, e.g., Adrian & Liang, supra note 81, at 19; OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 
77, at 34–35, fig.26. The tri-party repo agreement market is one major area of concern in this 
regard. See Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Speech at Workshop on 
Fire Sales as a Driver of Systemic Risk in Triparty Repo and other Secured Funding Markets: The 
Fire-Sales Problem and Securities Financing Transactions (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein20131004a.htm. Collateral quality 
requirements and mandatory minimum haircuts (which limit the amount of leverage that 
borrowers can assume) for these and other short-term securities funding transactions are used on 
a voluntary basis but have not yet been mandated by law in the United States. See OFFICE OF FIN. 
RESEARCH, supra note 77, at 43–44; OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 115, at 60–61. 
169. See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 77, at 34–35. 
170. See FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW 
BANKING: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR HAIRCUTS ON NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED SECURITIES 
FINANCING TRANSACTIONS 9 (Oct. 14 2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_141013a.pdf; see also Adrian & Liang, supra note 81, at 19–20. 
171. In January 2015, Governor Daniel Tarullo aired plans by the Federal Reserve Board to 
issue a rule proposing minimum margin requirements for certain types of securities financing 
transactions used by shadow banks. See Tarullo, supra note 79. In the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, Congress authorized the Federal Reserve Board to limit the leverage on stock purchases 
by investors by establishing minimum margin requirements. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78(g) (1934). Before 1974, the Board routinely moved the margin requirement up and 
down in an effort to affect the amount of stock market credit. By the 1970s, however, equity 
investors were able to leverage themselves through other means, including derivatives, calling the 
efficacy of margin requirements in tempering stock market bubbles into question. Since then, 
starting in 1974, the Board has left the margin requirement at a constant 50%. See Elliott et al., 
supra note 1, at 17–21; 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.4(b)(1), 220.12(a) (2015). 
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These technical design and coverage considerations are pressing and real. 
Yet they are not the only challenges facing countercyclical initiatives. As the 
next section discusses, other, considerable hurdles must be surmounted 
before robust countercyclical regulation can become a reality. 
IV. CHALLENGES 
Today’s focus on dampening financial cycles is long overdue and worth 
the effort. It is important to remember, however, that regulatory tools that 
look promising on paper can confront problems in implementation.172 In this 
section, I explore five major challenges to the successful execution of 
countercyclical regulation. These five challenges all involve the institutional 
settings in which countercyclical regulation would be implemented. If 
Congress and policymakers are deaf to these issues, countercyclical 
regulation could lack the institutional prerequisites to thrive. 
The first of these challenges concerns the federal government’s data 
collection initiatives. Those initiatives continue to lag and impede efforts to 
monitor the economy for emerging financial risks. For the most part, this is 
not for lack of statutory authority but due to delays in implementation. 
Second, and in a related vein, financial regulators need to do more to 
institutionalize an early response system to nascent threats. How to track 
threats from new financial products and respond to them pose particular 
challenges. 
Justifying intervention through rules when risks are small presents a third 
obstacle. Not only do regulators need to justify intervention to internal and 
external audiences, they may have to defend those decisions in court if 
challenged. The D.C. Circuit’s recent spate of hostile decisions overturning 
rules by the Securities and Exchange Commission on cost-benefit grounds 
underscores the difficulty of that task. 
The fourth problem, regulatory capture and inertia, goes hand-in-hand 
with the third. Countercyclical regulation offers some fresh ideas to deal with 
that problem, which I will explore. 
Finally, countercyclical regulation—like all regulation—must anticipate 
the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage. As I discuss, the Dodd-Frank Act took 
some tentative steps toward a new organizing principle for financial 
regulation—oversight according to risk, instead of entity or product—that 
could significantly curb domestic arbitrage. Federal financial regulation 
needs to be reorganized according to that principle, however, in order for 
                                                                                                                            
172. See Tarullo, supra note 79. 
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arbitrage to be seriously taken in hand. International arbitrage remains a 
separate challenge. 
These five challenges are not the only hurdles that regulators and society 
will face in moving to a countercyclical approach. But they are significant 
ones and have not received enough attention. While these obstacles are not 
insuperable, they must be squarely confronted in order for countercyclical 
regulation to be a success. 
A. Knowledge Requires Data 
Countercyclical regulation depends on intervention when risks are small. 
This sort of early intervention requires a robust ability to monitor the 
economy and quickly detect mounting risks.173 That, in turn, requires data. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 collapse, it became apparent how little data 
financial regulators had at their disposal in trying to contain the crisis. The 
two federal authorities at the controls—the Treasury Department and the 
Federal Reserve Board—were flying blind when Bear Stearns pleaded for a 
bailout in March 2008. They did not know who had financial exposure to the 
firm and whether those counterparties would fail if Bear Stearns reneged on 
its debts.174 The government confronted another information black hole when 
it had to sort through the size and state of over-the-counter credit default swap 
exposures during AIG’s bailout in the fall of 2008.175 
In 2008, the federal government also suffered from an information deficit 
involving residential mortgages. There was no one, comprehensive loan-level 
data set covering all residential mortgages made in the United States.176 The 
government had not assembled those data. Nor could it buy the data in a 
single data set because the best available data sets each covered only part of 
the market. To monitor loans bought by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, federal 
agencies had to acquire one data set; to analyze loans packaged into private-
label mortgage-backed securities, they had to buy another. Loans insured by 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were covered by a third data set, 
while loans held in portfolio by national banks were the subject of a fourth. 
                                                                                                                            
173. See, e.g., COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., CGFS PAPERS NO. 38 MACROPRUDENTIAL 
INSTRUMENTS AND FRAMEWORKS: A STOCKTAKING OF ISSUES AND EXPERIENCES 6 (May 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs38.pdf. 
174. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 49, at 89–90. 
175. See, e.g., id. at 106, 221–23. 
176. See Federal Housing Finance Agency and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to 
Partner on Development of National Mortgage Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Nov. 
1, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/federal-housing-finance-agency-and-
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-to-partner-on-development-of-national-mortgage-
database/. 
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Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data afforded the closest thing to 
full market coverage, but those data lacked numerous crucial data fields on 
loan origination and did not report on loan performance at all. Accordingly, 
any regulator wanting an overview of the entire home mortgage market had 
to piece the picture together from multiple and sometimes incompatible 
sources. 
These residential mortgage data sets had other problems. Publicly 
available data were scant and federal agencies with better data were not 
always willing to share those data with other agencies. As a result, federal 
agencies were heavily reliant on costly proprietary databases that were often 
subject to vendor restrictions. Vendors were known to try to intimidate the 
federal government from pursuing certain lines of mortgage research by 
threatening to cancel agencies’ licenses if the research went forward. 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress responded to these problems by 
empowering and sometimes requiring federal financial regulators to improve 
the data that are mandatorily reported to the government. The new Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), for instance, may require bank holding 
companies and nonbank financial companies to submit periodic or other 
reports in order to assess “the extent to which a financial activity or financial 
market in which the nonbank financial company or bank holding company 
participates, or the nonbank financial company or bank holding company 
itself, poses a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”177 Under 
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve Board now requires reporting by securities 
holding companies.178 Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) has adopted final rules pursuant to Dodd-Frank requiring money 
market funds and investment advisers for hedge funds, private equity funds, 
venture capital funds, and other private funds to report on their holdings, 
trading, and exposures.179 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has 
authority to collect information on “the organization, business conduct, 
                                                                                                                            
177. Dodd-Frank Act § 112(d)(3)(A); see also id. § 809(b)(2)–(b)(3). Any such data will be 
collected by the Office of Financial Research on behalf of FSOC. Id. §§ 112(d)(3)(A), 153(a)(1). 
The Federal Reserve Board or FSOC may require certain financial market utilities and clearing 
entities to submit similar reports. Id. § 809(b)(1), (b)(3). 
178. Id. § 618(c)(1); Supervised Securities Holding Company Registration, 77 Fed. Reg. 
32881, 32884 (June 4, 2012). 
179. Dodd-Frank Act § 404(a); see also id. §§ 407–08; Money Market Fund Reform; 
Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47736 (Aug. 14, 2014); Reporting by Investment Advisers 
to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on 
Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. 71128 (November 16, 2011); see also OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra 
note 115, at 112–14. 
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markets, and activities of covered persons and service providers.”180 Congress 
also instructed the Bureau to expand the mortgage origination data fields 
reported under HMDA181 and to establish a publicly available mortgage and 
default database in conjunction with the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development.182 Congress further imposed or expanded mandatory reporting 
requirements on swaps,183 asset-backed securities,184 and small business 
lending.185 
Ensuring that the government has adequate data to gauge systemic risks is 
a “moving target,” to quote the Office of Financial Research.186 In the short 
run, creating or expanding mandatory government reporting is costly and 
time-intensive because doing so often requires research into data standards 
and privacy safeguards followed by a lengthy rulemaking proceeding. In part 
for these reasons, some of the data improvements that Dodd-Frank mandated 
are underway but not in place.187 Other crucial data gaps still need to be 
addressed.188 Those data gaps involve bilateral repo trading, securities 
lending, separately managed accounts, captive reinsurers, and mortgage 
servicing.189 
                                                                                                                            
180. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(c)(4). The Bureau promulgated the final HMDA rule 
implementing this provision in 2015. Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 80 Fed. Reg. 
66128 (Oct. 28, 2015). 
181. Dodd-Frank Act § 1094(3). 
182. Id. § 1447. 
183. Id. §§ 721(a)(21), 723(a)(2), 725(e), 727–29, 733, 763(a), (c), (i), 766(a). 
184. Id. § 942(b). 
185. Id. §1071(a). 
186. See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 115, at 1, 105. 
187. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, has not finalized its reporting 
requirements for security-based swaps. See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORT 78 (2015). 
188. Cf. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 1, at 59 (“some of the data that a macroprudential 
supervisor will require is not currently being collected by central banks, prudential supervisors, 
or any other entities”). 
189. See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 115, at 107–12. There has been progress on 
the mortgage servicing front, however. In 2012, the CFPB and the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA) announced plans to unveil the National Mortgage Database, which would 
include data “spanning the life of a mortgage loan from origination through servicing . . . .” See 
Federal Housing Finance Agency and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to Partner on 
Development of National Mortgage Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/federal-housing-finance-agency-and-consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-to-partner-on-development-of-national-mortgage-database/. FHFA 
stated in an update in August 2014 that the National Mortgage Database would take “several years 
to complete.” FHFA Update About the National Mortgage Database, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY 
(Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Programs/Documents/NMDB_Update_08012014
.pdf. See also NAT’L MORTGAGE DATABASE, TECHNICAL REPORT 15-01 (Aug. 27, 2015) 
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These long rollout periods make it important to complete data reforms in 
one fell swoop. Because new reporting requirements will face inevitable 
industry pushback, it is important to make comprehensive changes 
expeditiously instead of repeatedly going back to the well. To pull off a 
comprehensive overhaul, regulators have to resist the pressure to omit the 
data fields that they need. In exchange, they should offer an olive branch to 
industry by limiting the need to alter the firms’ data reporting systems to a 
one-time change. 
Creating data that span the business cycle from peak to trough also takes 
time. This problem will slowly abate over the coming years as more data are 
collected. In the meantime, federal regulators will need to merge newly 
collected data sets with older data sets in order to have a proper historical 
perspective. 
One important feature of Dodd-Frank’s data collection provisions is that 
they allow federal regulators to address some of the reporting lags that plague 
the current systems. For instance, under the prior rule, Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act data had long reporting lags, with some home mortgage 
transactions being over a year old by the time they were reported to the 
federal government. That is too long a delay for regulators to detect 
accumulating risks in a timely manner. Other reporting lags are not quite as 
severe, but should also be revisited. Reducing these lags will substantially 
improve the federal government’s capacity to monitor systemic risk.190 
Until these Dodd-Frank reforms are in place and the data are collected, 
regulators will face the same obstacles in monitoring for early warning signs 
of problems that they faced in 2008. It is discouraging that so little progress 
has been made in implementing Dodd-Frank’s data-gathering mandates. 
Until the quality of the data available to the federal government is 
substantially improved, there is the danger that the last cycle of regulatory 
inaction will breed another, as the next section discusses. 
                                                                                                                            
(updating progress), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Programs/Documents/NMDB_Technical_Report
_15-01_082715.pdf. 
190. The CFPB’s final HMDA rule, issued in 2015, significantly reduced the lag time by 
requiring lenders making larger volumes of home mortgages to report data on a quarterly rather 
than annual basis. Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 80 Fed. Reg. 66128, 66129, 66313 
(Oct. 28, 2015).  
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B. Fast Response  
Government action in the face of threats is the sine qua non of 
countercyclical regulation. That action requires not only data, but a well-
functioning rapid response system as well.191 Establishing such a system and 
institutionalizing it will help ensure that senior agency management is 
apprised of imminent problems and summoned to action. 
For a rapid response system to be effective, it must first integrate data 
flows, both from outside sources and across the agency, and mine those data 
for developments on a timely basis. Data analysis is not enough, however. In 
addition, the agency must establish a decision-making process to evaluate 
new and continuing threats192 and decide on the proper course of action. That 
process must be led by senior managers and report directly to the top. Unless 
agencies institutionalize a system for promptly examining trends and 
consciously evaluating the need for action, the danger will persist that data 
analysis will end up, unread, in the proverbial dustbin. 
Of course, such a system assumes that regulators can even recognize 
threats. Many risks are well-known and eminently capable of tracking. But 
other hazards emanate from threats that are as yet unknown. Some new perils 
will catch even the most vigilant regulators unaware. 
Nevertheless, there are several things agencies can do to watch out for 
stealth threats. Most importantly, regulators need to level with themselves 
about what they do not know and how to develop that information. Financial 
innovations, for instance, are a perennial source of unknown risks. Many 
financial innovations are socially beneficial, but some, such as securitization 
and derivatives, also have the potential for harm. Supervisors cannot blithely 
assume that new products are benign. Instead, they need to track those 
                                                                                                                            
191. I am indebted to Ethan Bernstein and Jared English for many long conversations in 
which we discussed and debated the elements of such a system. 
192. The rapid evolution in systemic risk metrics is an important development in that regard. 
See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 32–33; Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, 
Macroprudential Policy—A Literature Review, 27 J. ECON. SURVS. 846, 860–63 (2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2335778; Lex Hoogduin et al., 
Macroprudential Instruments and Frameworks: A Stocktaking of Issues and Experiences 17–19 
(Comm. on the Glob. Fin. Sys. Papers No. 38, 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs38.htm; Lucia 
Alessi et al., Comparing Different Early Warning Systems: Results from a Horse Race 
Competition Among Members of the Macro-Prudential Research Network 1, 19 (Feb. 1, 2015) 
(unpublished working paper) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2566165. 
However, the metrics are still fairly crude. Borio notes, furthermore, that “it is not realistic to 
expect a single measure of systemic risk to cater for all purposes; in fact, it is actually dangerous 
to do so” because metrics that measure interlinkages “can provide the wrong signals” as to build-
ups in risk over time. Borio, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
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innovations in order to understand their benefits and drawbacks.193 In most 
cases, lack of statutory authority is not a problem because Dodd-Frank gave 
federal regulators such broad data collection authority. With those data, 
economists can run simulations to project the performance of new financial 
products under a wide range of economic conditions. 
Market research is likewise essential for identifying new and troubling 
trends. Analyst reports, securities filings, industry publications, and 
interviews with industry players can alert supervisors to nascent risks. State 
and local officials, citizen groups, and outside researchers can also flag 
incipient harm. Agencies should similarly cull examination reports, 
complaint data and other citizen reports for warning signs of problems. 
With regard to these types of individual reports, if countercyclical 
regulation is to work, regulators must avoid succumbing to certain instinctive 
fallacies. One such fallacy is the tendency of regulators to assume that 
anecdotal reports of harm are inconsequential. During the credit boom that 
led up to the near-meltdown of the financial system in 2008, there were ample 
anecdotal warnings of impending problems. Federal regulators were aware of 
many of those incidents, but dismissed them as isolated reports.194 If 
regulators had started tracking those incidents and amassed the data to 
analyze their growth, the 2008 crisis might have been averted. The enormity 
of that fallout underscored the need to treat anecdotal reports as cause for 
further inquiry, not as something to be ignored. 
Another, related fallacy is the failure to analyze or even consider the 
possibility of correlated risks. In recent years, the best example of this was 
former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke’s statement in June 
2007 that “the troubles in the subprime sector seem unlikely to seriously spill 
over to the broader economy or the financial sector.”195 As his statement 
suggested, Bernanke was well aware that the subprime mortgage market was 
imploding in mid-2007. But he seemed blind to the fact that the default of 
one mortgage made other mortgage defaults more likely. Similarly, he was 
tone-deaf that June to the possible detrimental effect of cascading mortgage 
defaults on mortgage-backed securities, credit derivatives, financial asset 
prices, the solvency of banks, and the economy at large. 
                                                                                                                            
193. See, e.g., Daniel Carpenter & Patricia A. McCoy, Keeping Tabs on Financial 
Innovation: Product Identifiers in Consumer Financial Regulation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. J. 
195, 195–96 (2013), http://www.law.unc.edu/journals/ncbank/volumes/volume18/18-nc-
banking-inst-special-edition-2013/keeping-tabs-on-financial-innovation-product-identifiers-in-
consumer-financial-regulation/. 
194. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 49, at 9, 61–64. 
195. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Address to the 2007 
International Monetary Conference: The Housing Market and Subprime Lending (June 5, 2007), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070605a.htm. 
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The last fallacy is regulators’ propensity to treat small-scale problems—
and sometimes larger ones—as already under control due to their size and 
thus in no need of attention. As the subprime crisis demonstrated, however, 
some small problems can mushroom into crises of catastrophic proportions. 
C. Justifying Action When Problems Are Small 
Countercyclical regulation advises taking action when problems are 
manageable. However, when social harm is unknown or limited in size, 
federal banking regulators have displayed an almost visceral reluctance to 
taking action. Sometimes this may result from industry capture.196 In other 
cases, though, regulators may be trying to balance legitimate tradeoffs 
between preventing systemic harm and stunting beneficial growth. 
Regulators can have good reasons for a “hands-off” approach during 
economic upswings, particularly where intervention could distort an 
otherwise healthy market. Still, the truism “small is good” does not invariably 
hold. Subprime residential mortgages, for example, comprised only 7.4% of 
the U.S. mortgage market in 2002, but grew large enough by 2006 (reaching 
a market share of 23.5%)197 to nearly topple the financial system. We do not 
want to repeat that gambit. Nevertheless, to the extent regulators use 
countercyclical tools to lean against the wind, questions will “naturally arise 
whether and how far [those tools are] stifling innovation and growth.”198 
Given these vagaries, taking countercyclical measures to deflate an asset 
bubble or advance other goals will present issues for regulators. Many 
countercyclical techniques require regulators, in the face of uncertainty, to 
decide which small problems are likely to grow. Prognostication of this sort 
is never assured. However, there are harbingers of later, major problems and 
supervisors should watch out for them. Rates of growth are key in that regard. 
Small risks that are growing at accelerating rates should be cause for concern. 
That is especially true for risks that pose a high degree of harm if they 
materialize. Additionally, regulators should look out for signs of a race to the 
bottom in which loose practices by questionable firms force reputable 
competitors to loosen their standards in order to preserve market share. We 
                                                                                                                            
196. See infra Section IV.D. 
197. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 70 fig.5.2 
(2011), http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report. 
198. COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., supra note 173, at 15. For concerns in this regard, see 
generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3309/. 
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saw such a race during the housing bubble, when risky hybrid adjustable-rate 
mortgages with lower initial payments crowded out safer fixed-rate loans.199 
In a related vein, regulators should keenly monitor correlated risks that 
could produce a domino effect of harm to the financial system if those risks 
materialize. We only need recall that trillions of dollars in mortgage-backed 
securities, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps depended 
on the performance of deteriorating home mortgages during the last run-up 
in credit. That edifice crumbled when droves of mortgages went into default. 
Finally, certain lax loan underwriting practices are perennial in nature and 
crop up in virtually every real estate bubble. Sectoral tools are well-designed 
to identify and curb those practices. 
Once regulators detect signs of a mounting asset bubble, there remains the 
question of what to do. Often they lack data on the underlying cause of the 
harm. Is it misaligned compensation? Flawed contracting mechanisms? 
Information asymmetries? Something else? If they cannot ascertain the cause, 
it may be hard to know what to fix. Similarly, data on the net effects of 
intervention versus inaction are even less common. The financial crisis 
revealed a dearth of data of this kind in retail credit markets and eventually 
propelled the prominence and growth of research on the economics of 
household finance.200 In the short run, however, that dearth of empirical 
findings is very real. 
Figuring out whether and how to intervene is often just the start of the 
process. In some cases, the agency will still have to satisfy a statutory 
standard for the consideration of costs and benefits.201 Doing so in the current 
judicial climate may be difficult and any regulations that are issued may 
attract legal challenge. 
Recent case law developments on cost-benefit analysis of financial rules 
are not encouraging. In 2011, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit struck an activist stance and overturned the proxy access 
rule that had recently been adopted by the SEC for failing to satisfy the 
applicable statutory standard for review.202 Even though Congress in the 
                                                                                                                            
199. See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of 
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1339–44 (2009). 
200. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell et al., Consumer Financial Protection, 25 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 91, 91 (2011), http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.25.1.91. 
201. For instance, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission is required to consider “the 
costs and benefits” of newly issued rules “in light of . . . considerations of the efficiency, 
competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets.” 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2) (2000). 
202. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The standard in 
question required the SEC to “consider . . . in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” Securities Exchange Act of 
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Dodd-Frank Act expressly directed the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule, the 
D.C. Circuit ruled that the final rule was arbitrary and capricious because the 
Commission had failed to adequately assess the economic effects of that 
provision. In the view of the court:  
[T]he Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the 
costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the 
certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; 
neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; 
and failed to respond to substantial problems raised by 
commenters.203 
The Business Roundtable decision later came under blistering attack for 
countermanding Congress’ commands, for grafting a cost-benefit 
requirement onto the SEC’s statutory review standard with no statutory 
authorization, and for privileging inaction.204 
Now consider a countercyclical rule promulgated when the immediate 
harm is small and the likelihood and magnitude of later harm is large but not 
certain. Further assume that the D.C. Circuit—however wrongly—expects 
the agency to conclude that the benefits of that rule outweigh the costs, based 
on quantitative analysis, in order to survive attack. On that evidentiary record, 
it could be hard to persuade a skeptical D.C. Circuit that the benefits of 
                                                                                                                            
1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2010); see also Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(c), 15 
U.S.C. § 80a–2(c) (2010); Securities Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b). As James Cox and Benjamin 
Baucom have thoughtfully argued, this standard does not impose a cost-benefit test, one, because 
Congress considered and rejected imposing a cost-benefit test on the SEC when it first adopted 
this standard in 1996, and, two, because all the standard requires the Commission to do is 
“consider” the four factors, not to reach a conclusion about the rule’s likely effect. James D. Cox 
& Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s 
Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1818–24 (2012). 
203. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49. This was not the first time the D.C. Circuit had 
invalidated an SEC rule under that standard. Previously, in Chamber of Commerce of United 
States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit had struck down another 
SEC rule, this one on the makeup of mutual fund boards of directors, under the Administrative 
Procedure Act for failing to satisfy the same test. The Business Roundtable decision came as a 
surprise because there, the SEC adduced substantially more evidence in favor of its proxy access 
test than it had in the rulemaking overturned in Chamber of Commerce in 2005. Another D.C. 
Circuit case, American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), invalidated the SEC’s attempt to regulate fixed indexed annuities for lack of a reasoned 
basis regarding its conclusion about the “competition” factor. 
204. See, e.g., Cox & Baucom, supra note 202, at 1837 (“the D.C. Circuit has not only 
flaunted the [SEC’s] Review Standard, but has also essentially invalidated the will of Congress”); 
Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2013); Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for 
SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. REG. 289, 313–17 (2013). 
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intervention merit the expense. This is largely because countercyclical 
intervention presents a special case of the general evidentiary quandary that 
proof of benefits is harder to come by than proof of costs. Measuring future 
benefits in financial regulation is often intractable, particularly because a 
“crisis that is successfully averted by macroprudential policy leaves no 
traces.”205 Measuring costs, while easier, is by no means free from 
difficulty.206 Thus, it is hard in general to make a cost-benefit case for 
regulating existing problems and even harder when the data on those 
problems are scant.207 These evidentiary problems become even more 
protracted when there are new, emerging threats with little past data for 
analysis. Such threats could emanate from financial innovations with a short 
track record or little-understood changes in the structure of the financial 
landscape. 
Countercyclical rules adopted in the throes of a crisis, when evidence of 
benefits is more plentiful, may be able to surmount these problems with cost-
benefit tests. But when times are calm, rules addressing new perils may be 
more difficult to defend in court. Fortunately, some financial rules do not 
require cost-benefit analysis at all. For those that do, normally the statutory 
test only requires “consideration” of costs and benefits and not a conclusion 
as to their relative weight.208 However, if the D.C. Circuit continues to 
construe these and other statutory review standards aggressively to 
nevertheless impose a strict, quantitative cost-benefit test in derogation of the 
statutory text, regulators may not have enough solid proof of harm to satisfy 
the courts. 
In the long run, Congress or the Supreme Court may have to resolve this 
conundrum in order for countercyclical regulation to fully work. In the short 
run, this problem may force agencies to resort to other, more limited 
regulatory tools—such as enforcement, non-binding guidances, or pilot 
projects209—in order to thwart unfamiliar threats before they spin out of 
control. 
                                                                                                                            
205. COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., supra note 173, at 6. 
206. See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: 
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 255, 258–61 (2007). 
207. See COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., supra note 173, at 6. 
208. See 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2). 
209. In this regard, Cox & Baucom recommend pilot projects where regulators could phase 
in regulation in order to generate data on an initial foray’s effects. See Cox & Baucom, supra note 
202, at 1842–44. For a kindred proposal for “staged regulation,” see Charles K. Whitehead, The 
Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1295–
1307 (2012). 
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D. Capture and Regulatory Inaction 
So far, I have assumed that the regulator in question is committed to a 
countercyclical course of action. But in halcyon times, industry capture210 and 
lobbying by other affected constituencies211 can weaken regulators’ resolve. 
It is hard enough to amass support for needed safeguards immediately after a 
crisis. Doing so when economic conditions are bright can threaten a 
regulator’s career. When memories of disasters grow dim, officials who 
predict catastrophes based on limited problems are often dismissed as 
Cassandras. Under those circumstances, many officials take the path of least 
resistance and sit on their hands because any eventual harm will not appear 
on their watch.212 It takes a brave regulator to tighten regulation under these 
conditions. 
Careful thought needs to be given to capture dynamics when overhauling 
regulation to dampen financial cycles. In this regard, it is helpful to view 
countercyclical tools along a continuum, ranging from self-executing 
techniques to those that require a discretionary decision by regulators (or 
even regulated entities) before they can be deployed. Dynamic provisioning 
is self-executing in nature because the level of provisioning it requires at any 
particular time is hard-wired into a mathematical algorithm.213 Monetary 
policy, on the other hand, requires an exercise of judgment by the Federal 
Open Market Committee to intervene in an overheated economy, based on its 
evaluation of asset price movements. Still other tools fall—or could be 
designed to fall—in the middle of the continuum. Prompt corrective action, 
for instance, uses objective numerical triggers but relies on regulators to take 
the actions mandated by those triggers. Similarly, countercyclical capital 
buffers could fall on the discretionary end or in the middle of the spectrum, 
depending on how they are designed.214 
                                                                                                                            
210. For an introduction to the literature on capture, see generally, PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE (Daniel Carpenter & David M. Moss eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013); Ernesto Dal 
Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203 (2006); George J. Stigler, 
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
211. See, e.g., Arthur W.S. Duff, Central Bank Independence and Macroprudential Policy: 
A Critical Look at the U.S. Financial Stability Framework, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 195, 204 
(2014), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bblj/vol11/iss1/4. 
212. See, e.g., Borio, supra note 1, at 12 (“Especially in the time dimension, the political 
economy pressures and the temptation to discount risks can be too powerful”); BARTH ET AL., 
supra note 32, at 113–14; Edward J. Kane, Changing Incentives Facing Financial-Services 
Regulators, 2 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 265, 266 (1989); Ross Levine, The Governance of Financial 
Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis, 12 INT’L REV. OF FIN. 39, 39 (2011). 
213. That is not to say that the algorithm cannot be manipulated. But if the algorithm is 
administered in good faith, it should be self-executing. 
214. See Repullo & Saurina, supra note 111, at 4–5. 
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The most effective way to overcome regulators’ propensity toward inertia 
at the top of the business cycle is to tie their hands in advance through rules 
that automatically kick in when markets heat up.215 Some of these rules will 
be fixed rules that only become economically binding when credit conditions 
relax or losses mount.216 Such rules will not constrain credit conditions during 
recessions, when lending is already tight; instead, whether those rules are 
binding will depend on the point in the business cycle. Other times, Congress 
or agencies can mandate time-varying statutes or rules that require regulators 
to take specific actions when objective tripwires go off. The prompt 
corrective action rules emulate this model and other examples can be 
envisioned. 
When designing pre-commitment devices, consideration should also be 
given to incorporating objective tests. Any time-varying countercyclical 
device that requires supervisors to make judgments about whether and when 
to pull the trigger reintroduces the problem of regulatory discretion and likely 
inaction. Of course, objective triggers have potential drawbacks. They may 
over-regulate or under-regulate (the problem with the prompt corrective 
action triggers). And they may make regulatory arbitrage easier. But given 
the disastrous systemic harm from the last financial crisis, these risks may 
pale in contrast to doing nothing. And, with experience, objective triggers can 
be refined over time. 
In order for pre-commitment devices to work best, they should be adopted 
in advance, in a favorable political climate.217 Usually this is in the aftermath 
of a financial crisis. This approach works well for recurrent problems, such 
as the tendency to loosen lending standards. In other ways, though, this 
approach to regulation suffers from rear-view vision. It is not well suited to 
new and unknown perils, such as those posed by some new financial 
products. 
                                                                                                                            
215. See, e.g., Borio, supra note 1, at 11; BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 57. 
216. Dynamic provisioning is one example; the ability-to-repay rule is another. When the 
ability-to-repay rule was introduced, private lending standards were so tight that the rule did not 
tighten them any further. However, as credit conditions loosen, the rule will exercise a real 
constraint on the market. 
217. In a recent speech, Federal Reserve Board Governor Daniel Tarullo cast doubt on the 
practicality of time-varying countercyclical tools, in part because he doubted “the speed with 
which measures might realistically be implemented and take effect.” See Tarullo, supra note 79. 
Careful implementation decisions, however, can address Governor Tarullo’s concerns about 
speed. Designing time-varying provisions with objective triggers and authorizing them soon after 
a financial crisis through implementing legislation and rules can insure that the measures are 
available and activated when needed. 
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This means that our system will have to find other ways of reversing the 
traditional “hands-off” mentality towards new and unfamiliar financial 
products.218 Requiring financial innovations to be registered and tracking 
their performance through mandatory reporting would not be terribly 
intrusive and would be a first step toward better risk assessment.219 If a 
product proved harmful, mandatory reporting would allow regulators to 
detect that harm and justify action going forward. Reporting is not a panacea 
because informal rulemakings still require a long lead time.220 But not 
tracking the performance of new products would be worse.  
Some types of countercyclical regulation may not be amenable to the pre-
commitment devices that I describe. Monetary policy is one example. 
Similarly, Brunnermeier, et al., argue that executive pay reforms counsel a 
large dose of regulatory discretion in order to avoid distorting the healthy 
aspects of the market for executives and discouraging executives and 
employees from taking personal initiative.221 
All is not lost, however. Here, conscious use of other techniques to spur 
regulators into action can be helpful. Some regulatory standards, for example, 
establish a minimum federal floor that state regulators may exceed if they 
conclude that the floor is too low.222 This type of statutory design encourages 
regulators to compete with one another for more optimal regulation (so long 
as the state and federal rules are not inconsistent) when federal rules under-
regulate. 
Checks and balances in the form of multiple centers of enforcement can 
also serve to prod laggard agencies into action. The U.S. federalist system 
affords a variety of different types of governmental actors—with varying 
incentives and degrees of susceptibility to influence—who can serve as 
checks and balances, if so empowered. In recent years, the New York 
Attorney General’s Office and the New York Department of Financial 
Services have served that role, taking an aggressive stance against financial 
                                                                                                                            
218. See, e.g., ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 
48–51, 268–69 (Penguin Press 2007); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of 
Governors, Remarks at the HM Treasury Enterprise Conference (Jan. 26, 2004), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040126/default.htm. 
219. Daniel Carpenter and I proposed instituting prior registration and reporting requirements 
to track new financial products through unique product identifiers. See Carpenter & McCoy, supra 
note 193, at 220–21. 
220. For example, witness the ability-to-repay rule. Even though it was a fast-track rule 
prescribed by Congress in July 2010, the rule was not promulgated in final form until January 
2013 (in time for its statutory deadline). 
221. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 49–53. 
222. See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-221, §§ 501(b)(2), (b)(4), 525, 94 Stat. 132; Dodd-Frank Act § 1041(a)(2). 
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sector misconduct and lighting a fire under the SEC and the federal prudential 
banking regulators in the process on more than one occasion.223 Dodd-Frank 
institutionalized a similar approach by giving state attorneys general and state 
banking regulators the power to enforce federal consumer financial 
protection statutes, on top of the enforcement authority vested in the federal 
government.224 Private rights of action can also have power to shame agencies 
into action. 
The integrity of countercyclical regulation also underscores the 
importance of safeguarding the independence of the financial regulators who 
administer them.225 This is why the funding of every federal banking regulator 
is independent of the Congressional appropriations process. While there are 
campaigns from time to time to eliminate that independence,226 doing so 
would increase industry capture. 
Agency independence, however, must go hand-in-hand with greater 
transparency. Such transparency can vest hard decisions with greater 
legitimacy and help obviate the back-room lobbying that causes agencies to 
drag their feet. Central banks and other prudential bank regulators balance 
independence with transparency in a number of ways, including solicitation 
of public comments on proposed rules, agency hearings, public release of 
deliberations and explanations of monetary and other decisions, and 
legislative testimony.227 Requiring agencies to timely publish online 
summaries of the contents of their private meetings with lobbyists228 is one 
more measure that could expose agency inaction to scrutiny. 
Because countercyclical regulation is premised on early intervention, it 
has no chance of succeeding unless it comes to grips with regulatory inertia 
and capture. This is not a lost cause, however. Pre-commitment devices, 
monitoring of new financial products, multiple centers of regulation and 
enforcement, agency independence, and greater transparency are methods 
that can help turn inaction into action. 
                                                                                                                            
223. Examples include the mutual fund market timing scandals in the early 2000s, the 
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E. The Boundary Problem and Regulatory Arbitrage 
The final hurdle to effective countercyclical regulation that I will discuss 
is the so-called boundary problem. This problem is endemic to financial 
regulatory schemes that supervise according to entity or product instead of 
risk.229 Federal prudential banking regulation, for example, regulates 
depository institutions and their parent companies and affiliates, but not other 
types of nonbank entities that offer banking services. Under this fragmented 
regulation, banks may seek to circumvent countercyclical requirements by 
shifting their business operations to other types of firms that escape those 
requirements.230 Possible tactics include outsourcing operations to special 
investment vehicles (known as SIVs) or less regulated nonbank affiliates.231 
Such arbitrage is of particular concern given the bank-centric nature of the 
current set of countercyclical tools.232 
Regulating according to product in the U.S. is even more ubiquitous than 
regulating according to entity and also leaves space for arbitrage. For 
example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises 
“the business of banking” by national banks233 and the SEC regulates 
“securities,” while the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
oversees “commodities.” 
Recasting a financial product as something else may successfully evade a 
regulatory model based on product line. For instance, lenders can try to 
circumvent rules on lending by recharacterizing loans as sales. Examples 
include sale-leaseback arrangements and sale-repurchase transactions in the 
repo market, which are both the functional equivalent of loans. 
 Congress, agencies, and courts have struggled with circumvention of 
product boundary lines for years.234 To some extent, Congress can discourage 
such evasion by including anti-evasion clauses in legislation and by drafting 
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statutes flexibly to place both traditional financial products and their 
functional substitutes under supervision. Courts have also repeatedly 
construed agency statutes to regulate according to a product’s function and 
not just according to its form.235 
While regulatory arbitrage cannot be completely eliminated, Congress and 
regulators can do more to discourage it. The most important step that 
Congress could take would be to scrap product and entity categories 
altogether and regulate solely according to risk.236 Extending regulation to all 
financial firms that present a given risk, without regard to the type of entity, 
charter or location, would substantially close the loopholes for outsourcing to 
domestic nonbanks. 
Congress made a stab in that direction in the Dodd-Frank Act when it gave 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau jurisdiction to promulgate market 
conduct rules governing virtually all providers of consumer finance, 
regardless of entity type.237 This broad jurisdiction is nationwide and covers 
bank and nonbank providers alike. As a consequence, the CFPB has an 
important and unique role to play in stemming systemic risk—particularly in 
the residential mortgage market—which federal prudential banking 
regulators cannot fully replicate, given the statutory limitations on their 
jurisdiction. 
Expanding regulation according to risk would require wholesale 
revamping of the federal government’s financial services regulatory 
architecture. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress had that opportunity but 
passed it up. Dodd-Frank did not disturb the traditional division of federal 
bank regulatory power among the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, apart from reassigning oversight of 
consumer financial protection to the CFPB. While Congress did fold the 
                                                                                                                            
235. See, e.g., NationsBank of North Carolina, 513 U.S. at 256–59; W.J. Howey Co., 328 
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former and discredited Office of Thrift Supervision into the OCC, that change 
was of second-order importance. Similarly, Congress did not make 
fundamental changes to the messy division of product-line authority between 
the SEC and the CFTC, except for derivatives. If Congress declined to tackle 
this task in Dodd-Frank, in the wake of the worst U.S. financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, the prospects for future structural change are daunting. 
Dodd-Frank’s systemic risk provisions offer a way to bypass this problem. 
Under Dodd-Frank, FSOC has the authority to make recommendations to 
primary financial regulatory agencies to apply new or strengthened 
safeguards to financial activities or practices that could create a risk of 
financial contagion.238 While these recommendations are not binding, they 
have substantial practical force and can serve to trigger systemic risk 
regulation across product lines and industries.239 
A final example of the boundary problem—international arbitrage—is 
arguably the most intractable. Many firms will try to escape the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States by sending operations abroad. Bilateral 
cooperation is not a panacea because there will always be some jurisdiction 
that is willing to host those operations in exchange for revenue and jobs. To 
the extent that firms use overseas affiliates to market products in the United 
States, the government can intervene at the point of entry. Thwarting cross-
border regulatory arbitrage is much harder where the foreign operations do 
not market themselves domestically, but nevertheless threaten systemic 
spillover effects that could harm large U.S. financial institutions. 
The only immediate solution to such arbitrage lies in international 
cooperation and standards.240 In the financial arena, the Financial Stability 
Board (spearheaded by the leaders of the G20 nations), the Bank for 
International Settlements, and, to a lesser extent, the International Monetary 
Fund have become fora for harmonizing global macroprudential standards.241 
Nevertheless, absent a supranational regulator with binding enforcement 
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supra note 77, at 41. This reciprocity has its limits, however, because it does not require foreign 
regulators to impose a countercyclical capital buffer on non-U.S. exposures.  
241. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 1, at 63. 
  
 
 
 
1236 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
power, opportunities for overseas arbitrage will continue to abound. 
Complicating this challenge, imposing macroprudential measures cross-
border may not always work because different jurisdictions may find 
themselves at different points in the business cycle.242 
In closing, the boundary problem is palpably real and will live on without 
comprehensive reforms. While agencies and courts are not powerless to fight 
arbitrage through liberal interpretation of regulators’ authorizing statutes, 
there are limits to that strategy. Dodd-Frank’s decision to give rulemaking 
authority to the CFPB over consumer financial protection, regardless of entity 
or product type, was a step in the right direction. A more comprehensive 
approach to regulating according to risk, not to entity or product, is needed 
to seal off arbitrage opportunities effectively. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In financial regulation, true innovations come seldom if ever. 
Countercyclical regulation, however, is the rare exception. If countercyclical 
regulation is given the chance to take root and thrive, it has the potential to 
accomplish what procyclical regulation has never achieved: i.e., modulating 
and even preventing future financial crises. As the 2008 financial crisis and 
the ensuing fallout showed, the stakes are too high to ignore the benefits of a 
countercyclical approach. 
 If countercyclical regulation is to succeed, any serious effort to 
implement it must confront and address the institutional hurdles to its success. 
In this Article, I have identified five major obstacles, including data gaps, the 
need for early response systems, issues in determining whether and when to 
take action, industry capture, and regulatory arbitrage. These obstacles are 
not insuperable. With each passing year, the necessary data to monitor 
systemic risk are improving and the new Office of Financial Research (OFR) 
has emerged as a powerful advocate for more change.243 Meanwhile, the 
annual systemic risk assessments by FSOC244 and OFR245 are informing early 
response initiatives across the federal government. 
As for counteracting regulatory inertia and justifying action when 
problems are small, countercyclical regulation provides tools to address those 
issues. The expanding countercyclical toolkit makes it easier for regulators to 
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justify early intervention by deploying more tailored techniques, such as 
sectoral tools, that single out lax practices that are known to fuel credit 
bubbles without impairing healthy credit. Similarly, countercyclical 
regulation offers pre-commitment devices and objective tests to help insulate 
regulators from political pressure not to act. Empowering the states to exceed 
federal standards and to enforce federal laws can reinforce incentives for 
federal regulators to be proactive as well. Finally, regulation according to risk 
and greater international harmonization of systemic risk standards can make 
significant inroads into the ever-present problem of arbitrage. 
